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AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED? A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED
REFORMS TO TASMANIA’S ‘HATE SPEECH’
LAWS
Joshua Forrester,* Augusto Zimmermann,** and Lorraine Finlay***

ABSTRACT
The Tasmanian government has proposed reforms to the ‘hate
speech’ provisions in the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas).
However, these reforms are unsatisfactory. They do not address,
and in fact compound, the constitutional invalidity of Tasmania’s
‘hate speech’ laws. In this article, we demonstrate that
Tasmania’s present ‘hate speech’ laws, like equivalent
provisions in other States and Territories, impermissibly infringe
the implied freedom of political communication. We also
demonstrate that certain proposed reforms further infringe the
implied freedom of political communication. We will conclude by
proposing elements of a constitutionally valid law against
incitement to enmity.

I

INTRODUCTION

In September 2016, the Tasmanian government introduced to the
Tasmanian Parliament the Anti-Discrimination Amendment Bill 2016 (the
‘Bill’). The Bill proposes amending Tasmania’s ‘hate speech laws found
in its Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) (the ‘Act’) (we refer below to
these proposed amendments as the ‘proposed reforms’). In this article, we
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argue that the proposed reforms are entirely unsatisfactory. This is
because the proposed reforms do not overcome the constitutional
invalidity of sections 17(1),1 19,2 203 and 554 of the Act.
Our argument is broken into the following parts. In Part II, we provide
background to the proposed reforms. In Part III, we outline the proposed
reforms. In Part IV, we argue that those parts of s 17(1) that make
unlawful (amongst other things) certain acts that offend, insult, ridicule or
humiliate, are unconstitutional. This is because these parts of s 17(1)
impermissibly infringes the freedom to communicate about government
and political matters implied from the Commonwealth Constitution.5
In Part V, we argue that s 55, which provides exceptions to s 17(1), does
not overcome s17(1)’s difficulties but actually worsens them. Further, s
55

impermissibly

infringes

the

implied

equality

of

political

communication for which we argued in our book No Offence Intended:
Why 18C is Wrong.6 In Part VI, we analyse the proposed reforms in light
of our analysis of ss 17(1) and 55. We also comment on the proposed

*
**

BA (Hons) (Murd), LLB (Hons) (UWA), PhD Candidate (Murdoch).
LLB (Hons), LLM cum laude, PhD (Mon), Director of Postgraduate Research,
Murdoch Law School; Law Reform Commissioner, Law Reform Commission
of Western Australia; Professor of Law (Adjunct), University of Notre Dame
Australia, Sydney.
*** BA (UWA), LLB (UWA), LLM (NUS), LLM (NYU), Lecturer in
Constitutional Law, Murdoch Law School.
1
Subsequent mentions of s 17(1) of the Act will be to just ‘section 17(1)’ or ‘s
17(1)’ as the case requires.
2
Subsequent mentions of s 19 of the Act will be to just ‘section 19’ or ‘s 19’ as
the case requires.
3
Subsequent mentions of s 20 of the Act will be to just ‘section 20’ or ‘s 20’ as
the case requires.
4
Subsequent mentions of s 55 of the Act will be to just ‘section 55’ or ‘s 55’ as
the case requires.
5
We refer to this freedom below as ‘the implied freedom of political
communication’.
6
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) (‘No Offence Intended’).
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reforms to s 64 of the Act,7 which provides for the rejection of complaints
made under the Act.
In Part VII, we argue that s 19, which makes unlawful certain public acts
that incite hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule, is unconstitutional.
This is because s 19 impermissibly infringes the implied freedom of
political communication. In this Part, we also examine similar ‘hate
speech’ provisions in the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (the
‘NSW Act’) and the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) (the
‘Victorian Act’). We conclude that, like s 19, the NSW and Victorian
provisions impermissibly infringe the implied freedom of political
communication. In Part VIII, we argue that s 20, which makes unlawful
promoting discrimination and prohibited conduct (including that made
unlawful by ss 17(1) and 19) is unconstitutional. Like ss 17(1) and 19, s
20

impermissibly

infringes

the

implied

freedom

of

political

communication. In Part IX, we suggest elements of an alternative laws
that would be less restrictive of freedom of expression while targeting
enmity and incitement to violence.
Before going further, we should note that this article is intended to build
upon the work in our book No Offence Intended.8 In No Offence Intended
we examined, amongst other things, whether or not s 18C of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (‘RDA’) 9 impermissibly infringes the
implied freedom of political communication. Section 18C can be
considered the Commonwealth’s ‘hate speech’ law. In this article, we
extend our analysis to whether State ‘hate speech’ laws impermissibly
7

8

9

Subsequent mentions of s 64 of the Act will be to just ‘section 64’ or ‘s 64’ as
the case requires.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016).
Subsequent mentions of s 18C of the RDA will be to just ‘section 18C’ or ‘s
18C’ as the case requires.
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infringe the implied freedom of political communication. It should be
noted from the outset that our analysis in this article is based on that
found in No Offence Intended. However, we will summarise (and, where
needed, refine) the arguments presented in No Offence Intended when
required.

II

BACKGROUND TO THE PROPOSED REFORMS

In September 2015, Martine Delaney lodged a complaint under the Act
with

Tasmania’s

Anti

Discrimination

Commissioner

(the

‘Commissioner’) against the Catholic Church and, in particular,
Archbishop Julian Porteous.10 This complaint concerned Don’t Mess With
Marriage,11 a Pastoral Letter issued by the Catholic Bishops of Australia
concerning the same-sex marriage debate in Australia. Don’t Mess With
Marriage stated, amongst other things, that ‘marriage should be a
“heterosexual union between a man and a woman” and changing the law
would endanger a child's upbringing’.

12

The complaint was later

dropped.13 However, the complaint prompted the Tasmanian government
to consider reforming its ‘hate speech’ laws.14

10

11

12

13

Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Anti-discrimination complaint “an
attempt to silence” the Church over same-sex marriage, Hobart Archbishop
says’, ABC News (online), 28 September 2015 <http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2015-09-28/anti-discrimination-complaint-an-attempt-to-silence-thechurch/6810276>.
Australian Catholic Bishops Conference, Don’t Mess With Marriage: A
Pastoral Letter from the Catholic Bishops of Australia to all Australians on the
‘Same-sex Marriage’ Debate (Australian Catholic Bishops Conference, 2015).
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Anti-discrimination complaint “an
attempt to silence” the Church over same-sex marriage, Hobart Archbishop
says’, ABC News (online), 28 September 2015 <http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2015-09-28/anti-discrimination-complaint-an-attempt-to-silence-thechurch/6810276>.
Andrew Drummond, ‘Transgender rights activist Martine Delaney drops
complaint over Catholic Church’s marriage booklet’, The Mercury (online), 5
May
2016
<http://www.themercury.com.au/news/tasmania/
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THE PROPOSED REFORMS

The proposed reforms seek to, amongst other things, amend the Act to:


Add ‘religious purposes’ to the exemptions in s 55.15 Presently, s 55
exempts public acts done for ‘academic, artistic, scientific or
research purposes’.16



Amend s 64 to require the Commissioner to reject a complaint in
certain circumstances.17

Before going further, we should note that an earlier version of the Bill
added a ‘reasonableness requirement’ to s 55. Presently, s 55 provides
that a public act be done ‘in good faith’.18 However, this reform would
have meant that a public act would have to be done ‘reasonably and in
good faith’. 19 This reform was removed from the Bill after public
consultation.

20

However, we will examine it below because a

‘reasonableness requirement’ may ultimately be added to s 55, either as
the result of the Bill’s current passage through Parliament or as the result
of some future reform.

14

15
16
17
18
19

20

transgender-rights-activist-martine-delaney-drops-complaint-over-catholicchurchs-marriage-booklet/news-story/d8d9079bf932526b27e5f094e57dbe84>.
Andrew Drummond, ‘Tasmania tussles over free speech debate’, news.com.au
(online), 20 September 2016 <http://www.news.com.au/national/breakingnews/tas-govt-tables-free-speech-amendment/newsstory/ac35b8f5e2fff4991e86f1e4aa9dce70>.
Bill cl 4.
Act s 55(c)(i).
Bill cl 5.
Act s 55(c).
This reform was contained in cl 4 of the version of the Bill released for public
comment.
See the second reading speech for the Bill: Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates,
Legislative Assembly, 22 September 2016, (Michael Ferguson)
<http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/ParliamentSearch/isysquerydb2b1433-fcb94565-881f-f3bcde3fd261/2/doc/>.
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Putting the ‘reasonableness’ requirement aside, the proposed reforms
presently in the Bill are unsatisfactory. They overlook that significant
parts, if not all, of ss 17(1) and 19 impermissibly infringe the implied
freedom of political communication. Further, the reforms to s 55 further
infringe the implied freedom of political communication by adding more
complexity and uncertainty to laws whose scope is already uncertain.
Finally, the changes to s 64 entail no consequences to the Commissioner
for failing to dismiss a complaint, thereby exposing all parties to
unnecessary costs in time, money and stress. We will now consider these
issues in greater depth.

IV

SECTION 17(1)

Section 17(1) presently provides:
A person must not engage in any conduct which offends, humiliates,
intimidates, insults or ridicules another person on the basis of an attribute
referred to in section 16(e), (a), (b), (c), (d), (ea), (eb) and (k), (f), (fa), (g), (h),
(i) or (j) in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the
circumstances, would have anticipated that the other person would be offended,
humiliated, intimidated, insulted or ridiculed.

The attributes mentioned in s 16 of the Act to which s 17(1) refers are (in
the order they appear in s 17(1)): gender, race, age, sexual orientation,
lawful sexual activity, gender identity, intersex, disability, marital status,
relationship status, pregnancy, breastfeeding, parental status and family
responsibilities.
In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,21 the High Court noted
that the implied freedom of political communication applies to State as

21

[1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520 (‘Lange’).
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As presently drafted, s 17(1)

impermissibly infringes the implied freedom of political communication.
The test for determining whether or not a law impermissibly infringes the
implied freedom of political communication is that stated in Lange as
modified in McCloy v New South Wales23 (which we refer to below as the
‘modified Lange test’). The modified Lange test is as follows:
1.

Does the law effectively burden the implied freedom of political
communication in its terms, operation or effect?

2.

If ‘yes’ to question 1, are the purpose of the law and the means
adopted to achieve that purpose legitimate, in the sense that they are
compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed
system of representative government?

3.

If ‘yes’ to question 2, is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted
to advance that legitimate object? If not, then the measure will
exceed the implied limitation on legislative power.24

We now examine each step of this test with respect to s 17(1).
A

Does s 17(1) burden the implied freedom of political
communication?

Section 17(1) burdens the implied freedom of political communication in
its terms, operation and effect. However, it is important to understand the
nature of the burden that s 17(1) imposes. This is because, in McCloy,
members of the High Court held that the impugned law’s overall burden
on the implied freedom of political communication was relevant to

22
23
24

Ibid 567.
[2015] HCA 34 (‘McCloy’).
Ibid [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
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determining whether or not it was impermissibly infringed. The majority
in McCloy noted that such a determination required comparing ‘the
positive effect of realising the law's proper purpose with the negative
effect of the limits on constitutional rights or freedoms’, and that
‘[l]ogically, the greater the restriction on the freedom, the more important
the public interest purpose of the legislation must be for the law to be
proportionate…’.25
Gageler J stated that judicial scrutiny of the relevant law should be
‘calibrated to the degree of risk to the system of representative and
responsible government established by the Constitution that arises from
the nature and extent of the restriction on political communication that is
identified at the first step in the analysis.’ 26 Nettle J observed that ‘a
direct or severe burden on the implied freedom requires a strong
justification’. 27 Gordon J stated that whether a law impermissibly
infringes the implied freedom of political communication ‘is a question of
judgment about the nature and extent of the effect of the impugned law
on the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of
representative and responsible government’.28
Section

17(1)’s

burden

on

the

implied

freedom

of

political

communication is direct, heavy, and sweeping. We will explain what we
mean by these terms.
1 A direct burden
Section 17(1) directly burdens the implied freedom of political
communication. This is because legislation made under various
25
26
27
28

Ibid [87] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (citations omitted).
Ibid [150] (Gageler J).
Ibid [255] (Nettle J).
Ibid [336] (Gordon J).
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Commonwealth heads of power necessarily entails communication
involving attributes that s 17(1) purports to protect from, amongst other
things, offence, insult, ridicule or humiliation.
For example, one of the protected attributes in s 17(1) is race. Section 3
of the Act defines ‘race’ as including colour, nationality, descent, ethnic,
ethno-religious or national origin, and the status of being or having been
an immigrant.29 Commonwealth legislation with respect to the following
heads of power may well involve discussing race, colour, ethnicity or
nationality:30


‘the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the
several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain
the laws of the Commonwealth’;31



‘quarantine’;32



‘naturalisation and aliens’;33



‘the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State,
for whom it is necessary to make special laws’;34

29
30

31
32

33
34

Act s 3 (definition of ‘race’).
The following lists are taken from Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and
Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor
Court, 2016) 119-20.
Commonwealth Constitution s 51(vi).
Ibid s 51(ix). This is not a fanciful inclusion. During the Ebola outbreak in
Africa in 2014, commentators noted racial aspects to restricting travel to and
from countries in which the Ebola outbreaks were located, and the treatment of
those afflicted with Ebola: see, for example, Hannah Kozlowska, ‘Has Ebola
Exposed a Strain of Racism?’, New York Times (online), 21 October 2014
<optalk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/has-ebola-exposed-a-strain-ofracism/?_r=1>.
Ibid s 51(xix).
Ibid s 51 (xxvi) (the strike-through appears in official versions of the
Commonwealth Constitution).
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‘immigration and emigration’;35



‘external affairs’;36



‘the relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the

2016

Pacific’;37 and


‘the influx of criminals’.38

Other heads of power that may involve discussing race, colour, ethnicity
or nationality include:


‘trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States’; 39



‘fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits’;40



‘census and statistics’;41 and



‘foreign corporations…’.42

As we noted in No Offence Intended, legislation or policy made under the
heads of power noted above, and especially those noted in the firstmentioned list, often involve discussing controversial issues. For
example, the matters of border protection, refugee intake and immigration
raise controversial issues concerning the level of refugee and immigrant

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Ibid s 51(xxvii).
Ibid s 51(xxix).
Ibid s 51(xxx).
Ibid s 51(xxviii).
Ibid s 51(i).
Ibid s 51(x).
Ibid s 51(xi).
Ibid s 51(xx).
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intake, the racial, ethnic or national composition of such intake and the
level of integration expected of immigrants.43
In addition to Commonwealth legislation, the Commonwealth’s executive
government is responsible for implementing legislation as well as other
executive functions.

44

The manner in which the Commonwealth’s

executive government does this with respect to matters involving race,
colour, ethnicity or nationality may also raise controversial issues. For
example, the manner in which Australia’s executive government conducts
border protection and administers refugee and immigration programs
involve controversial issues. To conclude with perhaps the most dramatic
(but not uncommon) example, Australia’s prosecution of wars involves
critical but controversial issues about the nature of the conflict and the
enemy.45
As to issues at State level, matters local to a State, such as law and order,
health, welfare, or education, may involve discussions involving race,
colour, ethnicity or nationality.46
To take another example, Commonwealth legislation or policy with
respect to the following heads of power may well involve discussing
sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, gender, gender identity, intersex
status, marital status, relationship status, pregnancy, position on
breastfeeding, parental status or family responsibilities. 47 These powers
include:

43

44
45

46
47

Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 120.
Commonwealth Constitution s 61.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 121.
Ibid.
These are protected attributes in s 17(1).
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Marriage;48 and



Parental rights.49

2016

As to marriage, controversies can and do arise concerning who may
marry, how many may marry, and over the consequences if a marriage
fails.
As to parental rights, controversies can and do arise over such things as
how a child is best raised and cared for, parental rights if a marriage fails,
surrogacy arrangements, and who can adopt.
2 A heavy burden
As to the heaviness of the burden that s 17(1) imposes, this requires
considering popular sovereignty, the general nature of laws and
discussions about them, the uncertainty of the terms used in s 17(1), and
the dispute resolution process that the Commissioner uses.
(a) Popular sovereignty
The Commonwealth Constitution provides for popular sovereignty. That
is, under the Commonwealth Constitution, the Australian people are
sovereign.50 It is Australian electors who elect representatives to make
laws on their behalf.

48
49
50

51

51

It is Australian electors to whom these

Commonwealth Constitution s 51(xxi).
Ibid s 51(xxii).
Unions NSW v New South Wales [2013] HCA 58; (2013) 252 CLR 530, 548
[17] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). See also McCloy [2015]
HCA 23 [45] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ), [215] (Nettle J), [318]
(Gordon J).
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1992] HCA 45;
(1992) 177 CLR 106, 137-8 (Mason CJ).
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representatives are ultimately answerable.52 And it is Australian electors
who have the power to amend the Commonwealth Constitution.53
The Commonwealth Constitution also provides for a Commonwealth
Parliament that, along with State and Territory Parliaments, has what is
known as the plenary power to make laws.54 These plenary powers are
extremely broad.

55

The Commonwealth Parliament is confined to

legislating with respect to matters under specified heads of power. That
said, the Commonwealth Parliament’s plenary power to legislate under
these heads of power is extremely wide. As to the State and Territory
Parliaments, unless confined by the Commonwealth Constitution56 or the
respective State or Territory constitutions, 57 their plenary powers to
legislate are unlimited in scope and extend to any matter.58 In summary,
Commonwealth, State, and Territory Parliaments may make laws with

52

53
54

55

56
57

58

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177 CLR 1, 47
(Brennan J). See also Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto
Zimmermann, No Offence Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016)
122.
Commonwealth Constitution s 128.
Section 51 of the Commonwealth Constitution provides that the Commonwealth
Parliament has the ‘power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the Commonwealth’ with respect to the various heads of power
specified in s 51.
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR
129, 151 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ).
Such as Commonwealth Constitution ss 114, 115.
We are referring to “manner and form” provisions that may force State
Parliaments to use certain procedures (special majorities, referendums, and the
like) to legislate with respect to laws concerning the constitution, powers and
processes of Parliament.
‘A power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of a territory
is as ample and plenary as the power possessed by the Imperial Parliament
itself’: Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1, 10
(Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). The
plenary power of the Tasmanian Parliament is not found in the Constitution Act
1934 (Tas). However, it is found in the Australian Constitutions Act 1850 (Imp)
s 14, which provides that the Tasmanian Parliament has the authority ‘to make
laws for the peace, welfare and good government of Tasmania’: see Strachan v
Graves (1997) 141 FLR 283, 289.
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respect to an extremely wide range of matters, including matters of great
controversy. Further, the content of these laws may be what many would
regard as extreme.59
The Commonwealth Constitution also provides for an executive
answerable to Parliament60 but who, in executing laws, may do acts that,
likewise, many would regard as extreme. In discussing legislative and
executive matters, the Commonwealth Constitution provides for
Parliamentary privilege.61 This is because members of Parliament must be
able to fully, frankly and robustly discuss all matters before Parliament.62
It follows that, as sovereign, the Australian people must also be free to
discuss controversial matters, or indeed any matter, fully, frankly and
robustly.63
Put another way, it borders on absurdity to say that, under the
Commonwealth Constitution, Parliament may pass outrageous laws, the
executive may do outrageous things, and members of Parliament may say
outrageous things. However, the people from whom Parliament, members
of Parliament and the executive derive their authority may not speak

59

60
61
62

63

Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 122.
Commonwealth Constitution ss 61, 64.
Ibid s 49.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 122.
Ibid 123. See also Lorraine Finlay, Augusto Zimmermann and Joshua Forrester,
‘18C is too broad and too vague, and should be repealed’, The Conversation
(online), 31 August 2016 <https://theconversation.com/section-18c-is-toobroad-and-too-vague-and-should-be-repealed-64482>.

Vol 7

The Western Australian Jurist

289

outrageously.64 If anything, in a democracy, a sovereign people must be
free to speak even the unspeakable.65
To be clear, there are limits to freedom of expression. However, these
limits are themselves strictly limited.66 However, s 17(1) imposes a heavy
restriction on freedom of expression, prohibiting even statements that
offend another person or group of people on the basis of certain
attributes.
(b) The general nature of laws and discussions about them
Legislative and executive action contemplated under the Commonwealth
Constitution and respective State and Territory constitutions operates
generally. That is, legislation rarely targets specific individuals.67 Rather,
legislation in all but rare cases concerns groups of people, ranging from
small groups up to the entirety of Australia’s population (or, in
Tasmania’s case, Tasmania’s population). Executive action may concern
individuals directly, but often concerns groups.68
Hence, when discussing matters that may be subject to government
action, it is common to make general statements about an issue. It is also
64

65

66

67

68

Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 130.
Ibid. See also Lorraine Finlay, Augusto Zimmermann and Joshua Forrester,
‘18C is too broad and too vague, and should be repealed’, The Conversation
(online), 31 August 2016 <https://theconversation.com/section-18c-is-toobroad-and-too-vague-and-should-be-repealed-64482>. Indeed, this must be so
with respect to any idea that may influence, or be the subject of, legislative or
executive action. This must also be so with respect to any person or group of
people who may influence, or be the subject of, legislative or executive action.
See Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 130.
Although a Parliament can enact a law targeting a specific individual: see Kable
v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51,
64 (Brennan CJ), 73-4 (Dawson J), 109, 121 (McHugh J), 125 (Gummow J).
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 121.
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common to refer generally to groups of people. Statements concerning
groups may not apply to individuals in that group. However, that lack of
specificity is the inherent price of discussions about proposed or past
legislative or executive action.69
The ‘chilling effect’ of a law that makes unlawful offending, insulting,
humiliating or ridiculing another person based on an attribute must not be
underestimated. Much has been made of the chilling effect of defamation
law, and rightly so.70 However, in defamation, one must only consider
whether or not their comment affects a particular individual’s own
reputation. Consequently, someone who wishes to comment on a political
issue in which that particular person is involved may avoid mention of
that person. By contrast, in our political system, it is far more difficult not
to comment about groups sharing certain attributes in political issues. As
noted above, in our system of representative and responsible government,
there are often controversial issues concerning such things as race, colour,
ethnicity, nationality and sexuality. Hence, making unlawful offending,
humiliating, insulting or ridiculing another person based on an attribute
has far more of a chilling effect.
Section 17(1) concerns acts that someone may find offensive, insulting,
ridiculing or humiliating based on that person’s race, age, sexual
orientation, lawful sexual activity, gender, gender identity, intersex status,
marital status, relationship status, pregnancy status, position on
breastfeeding, parental status or family responsibilities. Hence, s 17(1)
affects political discussions about groups with these attributes.
(c) The uncertainty of the terms used in s 17(1)
69
70

Ibid 121-2.
Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and
privacy, Report No 11 (1979) 22-3 [37].
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The terms ‘offend’, ‘insult’, ‘ridicule’ and ‘humiliation’ are not defined in
the Act. We will assume for our analysis that they will be interpreted
narrowly, that is, limited to serious instances of offence, insult, ridicule or
humiliation. 71 However, even if they are interpreted narrowly, there is
considerable uncertainty concerning their application to widely varied
circumstances.72 A statement that one person thinks is seriously offensive
another may think is ‘merely’ offensive (or even inoffensive).
Further, s 17(1)’s use of an objective test (specifically, a reasonable
person test) does not overcome these issues concerning uncertainty. This
is because reasonable minds applying the same reasonable person test
may come to different conclusions concerning whether or not a statement
was seriously offensive as opposed to ‘merely’ offensive (or even
inoffensive).
There are serious issues as to whether s 17(1) (either alone or in
conjunction with s 55) is too broad and too vague to be constitutional. In
No Offence Intended, we provided a detailed argument concerning the
concept of vagueness.73 What follows is a summary (and, where needed,
a refinement) of our argument. We will include in our summary some
observations about the concept of overbreadth that were not included in
71

72

73

We are assuming that the approach to interpreting these terms would be similar
to the approach that Kiefel J took in Creek v Cairns Post Pty Ltd. That is, ‘To
“offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate” are profound and serious effects, not to
be likened to mere slights’: Creek v Cairns Post Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1007;
(2001) 112 FCR 352, 356 [16] (Kiefel J). French J in Bropho v Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission endorsed this view: see Bropho v Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCAFC 16; (2004) 135 FCR
105, 124 [69]-[70] (French J) (‘Bropho’). We would note, however, that unlike
the RDA, the Act provides two civil provisions: ss 17(1) and 19. Section 19
covers more severe speech while s 17(1) covers less severe speech. The
presence of s 19 may count against narrowly interpreting s 17(1).
We assume that, were s 17(1) interpreted broadly, our arguments would apply
with greater force.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 192-7.
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No Offence Intended but are relevant to the constitutional validity of s
17(1) and other hate speech provisions.
Now to the summary: first, certainty is critical to the rule of law. As
McLachlin J (in dissent) noted in R v Keegstra regarding the concept of
vagueness:
As a matter of due process, a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons
‘of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application’. Such vagueness occurs when a legislature states its
proscriptions in terms so indefinite that the line between innocent and
condemned conduct becomes a matter of guesswork.74

As to the concept of overbreadth, her Honour noted, relevantly:
Statutes which open-endedly delegate to administering officials the power to
decide how and when sanctions are applied or licenses issued are overbroad
because they grant such officials the power to discriminate – to achieve
indirectly through selective enforcement a censorship of communicative content
that is clearly unconstitutional when achieved directly.75

Her Honour noted:
The rationale for invalidating statutes that are overbroad… or vague is that they
have a chilling effect on legitimate speech. Protection of free speech is regarded
as such a strong value that legislation aimed at legitimate ends may be struck
down, if also tends to inhibit protected speech.76

Second, legal theorists such as Ronald Dworkin and Lon Fuller have
spoken to the need for certainty. Dworkin noted that a vague law ‘places
a citizen in an unfair position of either acting at his peril or accepting a
74

75

76

R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697, 818 (‘Keegstra’) quoting Laurence Tribe,
American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 2nd ed, 1988) 1033-4.
Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697, 818 quoting Laurence Tribe, American
Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 2nd ed, 1988) 1056.
Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697, 819.
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more stringent restriction on his life than the legislature may have
authorized’.77 Fuller noted that ‘The desideratum of clarity represents one
of the most essential ingredients of legality’.78 Fuller warned that:
[I]t is a serious mistake – and a mistake made constantly – to assume that,
though the busy legislative draftsman can find no way of converting his
objective into clearly stated rules, he can always safely delegate this this task to
the courts or to special administrative tribunals’.79

Fuller further warned that some areas of the law were unsuited to creating
rules on a case-by-case basis.80 We noted that one such area was political
discussion, given its range and complexity.81
Third, vagueness and overbreadth are concepts useful to determining
whether a law impermissibly infringes the implied freedom of political
communication. They are readily applicable to an analysis under the
modified Lange test. The implied freedom of political communication is a
restriction on lawmaking. It follows that laws that are too broad or too
vague should be restricted. 82 Further, voiding laws for vagueness or
overbreadth would create a “buffer zone” around the implied freedom of
political communication as the concept of vagueness has around the First
Amendment of the US Constitution.

83

This discourages vague or

overbroad legislation being enacted.84

77
78
79
80
81

82
83

84

Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977) 221-2.
Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1964) 63.
Ibid 64.
Ibid.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 194.
Ibid.
See Note, ‘The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court’ (1960)
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 67, 75.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 194-5.
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Fourth, like freedom of expression at common law,85 the common law
principle of due process is of constitutional importance.86 Common law
due process includes the principle of certainty in the law. An individual
must be certain what the law is in order to avoid unlawful conduct. Given
that the common law informs the Commonwealth Constitution,87 common
law due process should inform whether a law impermissibly infringes the
implied freedom of political communication.88
Fifth, vagueness and overbreadth have been employed with respect to
both criminal and civil provisions. In Taylor v Canadian Human Rights
Commission, 89 a Canadian Supreme Court case concerning a civil
provision making unlawful communication likely to expose any person to
hatred or contempt, McLachlin J noted:
‘[Hatred and contempt] are vague and subjective, capable of extension should
the interpreter be so inclined. Where does dislike leave off and hatred or
contempt begin? ... The phrase does not assist in sending a clear and precise
85

86

87
88

89

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203; (2007)
243 ALR 606 [113] (Black CJ, French and Weinberg JJ) (‘Haneef’). See also
Evans v State of New South Wales [2008] FCAFC 130; (2008) 168 FCR 576,
594 [72] (French, Branson and Stone JJ) (‘Evans’); Monis v The Queen [2013]
HCA 4; (2013) 249 CLR 92, 128 [60] (French CJ) (‘Monis’).
Due process is one of the fundamental common law principles Australia has
inherited. Its sources are not only 25 Edward I (1297) Magna Carta ch 29, but
also 28 Edward III (1354), and 3 Charles I (1627) Petition of Right. As with the
Magna Carta, the latter statutes are either received law in certain states, or
applied by Imperial Acts legislation in other states.
Lange [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, 564.
This appears to be a situation that Brennan J described in Re Bolton; Ex Parte
Beane: ‘Many of our fundamental freedoms are guaranteed by ancient
principles of the common law or by ancient statutes which are so much part of
the accepted constitutional framework that their terms, if not their very
existence, may be overlooked until a case arises which evokes their
contemporary and undiminished force.’: see Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane [1987]
HCA 12; (1987) 162 CLR 514, 520-1 (Brennan J).
[1990] 3 SCR 892 (‘Taylor’). Taylor was decided along with Keegstra [1990] 3
SCR 697. Like Keegstra, the Canadian Supreme Court split 4:3, holding in
Taylor that s 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act did not violate the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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indication to members of society as to what the limits of impugned speech are.
In short, by using such vague, emotive terms without definition, the state
necessarily incurs the risk of catching, within the ambit of the regulated area
expression falling short of hatred.90

We suggest that her Honour’s comments apply to s 17(1)’s use of
‘offend’, ‘insult’, ‘ridicule’ and ‘humiliate’. Her Honour further noted:
[T]he chilling effect of leaving overbroad provisions “on the books” cannot be
ignored. While the chilling effect of human rights legislation is likely to be less
significant than that of criminal prohibition, the vagueness of the law means that
it may well deter more conduct than can legitimately targeted, given its
objectives.91

It is worth noting here another relevant Canadian Supreme Court case,
Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v Whatcott. 92 This case
concerned s 14 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 1979
(‘Code’).93 Section 14 in effect prohibited the publishing or display by
various means material ‘that exposes or tends to expose to hatred,
ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person or class
of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground’.94 Section 3 of the Code
listed prohibited grounds as including religion, creed, marital status,
family status, sexual orientation, disability, age, colour, ancestry,
nationality, place of origin, race or perceived race, receipt of public
assistance, and gender identity. 95 As can be seen, there are similarities
between s 14 and s 17(1).

90
91
92
93

94
95

Taylor [1990] SCR 892, 961-2.
Ibid.
[2013] SCC 11; [2013] 1 SCR 467 (‘Whatcott’).
Subsequent mentions of s 14 of the Code will be to just ‘section 14’ or ‘s 14’ as
the case requires.
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 1979 s 14(1)(b).
Code s 2(1)(m.01) (definition of ‘prohibited ground’).
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Writing for a unanimous Canadian Supreme Court, Rothstein J held that
‘ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of’ was overbroad.96
He remarked:
Restricting expression because it may offend or hurt feelings does not give
sufficient weight to the role expression plays in individual self-fulfillment, the
search for truth, and unfettered political discourse.

Prohibiting any

representation which “ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of”
protected groups could capture a great deal of expression which, while offensive
to most people, falls short of exposing its target group to the extreme detestation
and vilification which risks provoking discriminatory activities against that
group. Rather than being tailored to meet the particular requirements, such a
broad prohibition would impair freedom of expression in a significant way.97

We suggest his Honour’s comments readily apply to s 17(1).
The sixth and final point in our summary is that US or Canadian concepts
concerning vagueness or overbreadth need not be imported into the
modified Lange test for s 17(1) to be held unconstitutional. Sections s
17(1) and s 55 may, in any event, be considered too complex, intrusive
and/or uncertain to be considered reasonably appropriate and adapted to
the end they serve.
Given that an individual may breach s 17(1) by the mere act of speaking,
it must be certain in its application. Presently, it is not.

96
97

Whatcott [2013] SCC 11; [2013] 1 SCR 467, 519-20 [107]-[111] (Rothstein J).
Ibid 519 [109].
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(d) The operation and effect of s 17(1)
Section 17(1)’s operation and effect also burdens the implied freedom of
political communication. Hence, it is necessary to review the conciliation
process as well as the powers of Equal Opportunity Tasmania (‘EOT’).
The dispute resolution process is set out in Part 6 of the Act. The Office
of the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner outlines the procedure for
handling breaches of the Act on the EOT website.98 This process is as
follows:


A complaint is lodged with EOT.



The complaint is referred to the Commissioner.



The Commissioner conducts a conference with the aim of
conciliating the complaint.



If the matter is not resolved early, the Commissioner will investigate
it and decide whether the complaint should be dismissed, proceed to
conciliation, or be referred to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (the
‘Tribunal’) for an inquiry.

If the Commissioner refers the complaint to the Tribunal then the
proceedings in this jurisdiction are civil, not criminal, and a civil standard
of proof applies. However, even civil proceedings impose serious
burdens. Unlike criminal proceedings, there is no prosecutorial discretion
to drop a case. Rather, a civil litigant can press what may be frivolous or
vexatious proceedings. 99 Further, a lower standard of proof applies,
98

99

‘What
Happens
After
a
Complaint
is
OpportunityTasmania,<http://equalopportunity.tas.gov.au/
complaints/what_happens_after_a_complaint_is_made>.
Act s 71(3).

Made’,

Equal
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meaning a breach of a law affecting freedom of expression is easier to
establish. Finally, the respondent incurs costs in time, money and stress in
meeting cases. 100 As Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ noted in
Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd,101 ‘a civil action is as great,
if not a greater restriction than a criminal prosecution’.102
3 A sweeping burden
Section 17(1) imposes a sweeping burden on the implied freedom of
political communication in two ways. First, s 17(1) may be breached in
disputes over concepts that, largely or solely, are comprised of ideas.
For example, are ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ scientific facts or are they social,
cultural and political constructs?103 If race, ethnicity, or both, are social,
cultural and political constructs then these constructs are, largely or
solely, comprised of ideas.104 Even supposing biology plays a role in the

100

101
102

103

104

See Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 176.
[1994] HCA 46; (1994) 182 CLR 104 (‘Theophanous’).
City of Chicago v Tribune Co (1923) 139 NE 86, 90 (Thompson CJ) cited in
Theophanous [1994] HCA 46; (1994) 182 CLR 104, 130-1 (Mason CJ, Toohey
and Gaudron JJ).
Australian Law Reform Commission, The Protection of Human Genetic
Information, Report No 96 (2003) 922 [36.42].
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Racial Discrimination Bill 1974 (Cth)
stated that s 18C would use the definitions of ethnic origin in King-Ansell v
Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531 (‘King-Ansell’) and Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2
AC 548 (‘Mandla’): Explanatory Memorandum, Racial Discrimination Bill
1974 (Cth) 2. In King-Ansell, Richardson J stated that ‘The real test is whether
the individuals or the group regard themselves and are regarded by others in the
community as having a particular historical identity in terms of their colour or
their racial, national or ethnic origin’ and that ethnicity was defined as
a segment of the population distinguished from others by a sufficient combination of
shared customs, beliefs, traditions and characteristics derived from a common or
presumed common past, even if not drawn from what in biological terms is a common
racial stock. It is that combination which gives them an historically determined social
identity in their own eyes and in the eyes of those outside the group.
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determination of race or ethnicity, then the extent to which it influences
law and policy are ideas open to dispute.
As to marriage, this is an institution that is solely comprised of ideas that
are also open to dispute. For example, what are the spiritual aspects of
marriage? What are its secular aspects? What are the rights and
responsibilities of spouses? Who can marry? How many can marry? What
are the consequences when a marriage fails?
If discussion about marriage or parental rights involves matters of gender
or sexuality, then this raises further issues involving ideas. Is gender a
social construct?105 Is sexuality?106 Is sexuality fluid, fixed, or some mix
of the two?107 What do different cultures and religions have to say about
certain sexual practices? Should certain sexual practices be made

See King Ansell [1979] 2 NZLR 531, 542-3 (Richardson J). In Mandla, markers
of ethnicity were (among other things) a long shared history of the group; a
cultural tradition of the group’s own; and a common religion: see Mandla
[1983] 2 AC 548, 562 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton). However, as we noted in No
Offence Intended:
[t]he issue with incorporating religious, cultural, and historical factors is
that each of these factors involves ideas. Put broadly, religion involves
ideas concerning spirituality; culture involves ideas about how people
should conduct themselves individually and socially; the history of a
people involves ideas concerning their collective heritage and
experiences. All of these ideas may be, and often are, contested.’

105

106

107

See Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 135.
See, for example, Candace West and Don H Zimmerman, ‘Doing Gender’
(1987) 1(2) Gender & Society 125.
See, for example, Steven Seidman, The Social Construction of Sexuality (WW
Norton & Company, 2003); Pepper Schwatrz, ‘The Social Construction of
Heterosexuality’ in Michael Kimmel (ed), The Sexual Self: The Construction of
Sexual Scripts (Vanderbilt University Press, 2007) 80.
For example, the Kinsey Scale posits that sexuality exists on a continuum, see
Kinsey Institute, ‘The Kinsey Scale’, Kinsey Institute (online)
<https://www.kinseyinstitute.org/research/publications/kinsey-scale.php>.
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unlawful? Should others be encouraged? When should children be taught
about matters of sexuality? And who should teach them?
In discussions amongst electors about these matters, views will differ
sharply. Feelings will run high, and robust, heated discussion will occur.
Positions will be attacked with all the logical and rhetorical weapons that
opponents can muster, exposing them to withering critical scrutiny if not
outright scorn. Arguments will be lost, and lost badly. Feelings will be
hurt and pride will be wounded. Offence and insult, and even ridicule and
humiliation, are inevitable incidents of such discussion in a democracy.
However, s 17(1) purports to limit discussion of concepts that are, largely
or solely, comprised of ideas by imposing legal liability for offence,
insult, ridicule and humiliation. This is a sweeping intrusion into the
implied freedom of political communication.
Second, s 17(1) is sweeping because it burdens the implied freedom of
political communication of everyone in Tasmania. Similarly, the law
restricts common law freedom of expression – a freedom which itself has
constitutional significance –108 of everyone in the Tasmania. The law is
not confined to time or place. Indeed, s 17(1) affects even private acts.
This leads to an important question in the proportionality test: does s
17(1)’s purpose justify restricting a fundamental freedom held by every
Tasmanian, even considering the alternatives available? This is a question
to which we will return.

108

Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203; (2007) 243 ALR 606 [113] (Black CJ, French and
Weinberg JJ). See also Evans [2008] FCAFC 130; (2008) 168 FCR 576, 594
[72] (French, Branson and Stone JJ); Monis [2013] HCA 4; (2013) 249 CLR 92,
128 [60] (French CJ).
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B Is s 17(1)’s purpose legitimate?
Section 17(1)’s purpose is not compatible with Australia’s system of
representative and responsive government. In this system:
The provisions of the Constitution mandate a system of representative and
responsible government with a universal adult franchise, and s 128 establishes a
system for amendment of the Constitution in which the proposed law to effect
the amendment is to be submitted to the electors. Communication between
electors and legislators and the officers of the executive, and between electors
themselves, on matters of government and politics is ‘an indispensable incident’
of that constitutional system.109

Applying the principles of statutory construction, 110 it appears that s
17(1)’s purpose is to prohibit, amongst other things, offence, insult,
ridicule and humiliation 111 in pursuit of the Act’s overall purpose of
prohibiting discrimination. 112 However, this purpose is not an end
compatible with Australia’s constitutionally prescribed system of
representative and responsible government.113

109

110

111
112
113

Aid/Watch Incorporated v Federal Commissioner v Taxation [2010] HCA 42;
(2010) 241 CLR 539, 556 [44] (emphasis and citations omitted) cited in Wotton
v Queensland [2012] HCA 2; (2012) 246 CLR 1, 13 [20] (French CJ, Gummow,
Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).
In Saeed v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241
CLR 252, 264-5 [31] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) it
was noted ‘Statements as to legislative intention made in explanatory
memoranda or by Ministers, however clear or emphatic, cannot overcome the
need to carefully consider the words of the statute to ascertain its meaning’.
Act s 17(1).
Act Long Title.
Section 17(1) makes unlawful intimidation on the grounds specified: see Act s
17(1). Given that intimidation contains an element of threat, making unlawful
such conduct is compatible with Australia’s constitutionally prescribed system
of representative and responsible government. See also Joshua Forrester,
Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence Intended: Why 18C is
Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 115, 211.
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To reiterate and summarise what we argued in No Offence Intended,114 in
Coleman v Power,115 McHugh J noted that insults can be used as weapons
of intimidation that may have a chilling effect.116 However, McHugh J
also stated that ‘[t]he use of insulting words is a common enough
technique in political discussion and debates’ 117 and ‘…insults are a
legitimate part of the political discussion protected by the Constitution.
An unqualified prohibition on their use cannot be justified as compatible
with the constitutional freedom.’ 118 Gummow and Hayne JJ stated
‘[i]nsult and invective have been employed in political communication at
least since the time of Demosthenes.’119 Kirby J stated:
One might wish for more rationality, less superficiality, diminished invective
and increased logic and persuasion in political discourse. But those of that view
must find another homeland. From its earliest history, Australian politics has
regularly included insult and emotion, calumny and invective, in its armoury of
persuasion. They are part and parcel of the struggle of ideas.120

In Monis, Hayne J stated:
History, not only recent history, teaches that abuse and invective are an
inevitable part of political discourse. Abuse and invective are designed to drive
a point home by inflicting the pain of humiliation and insult. And the greater the
humiliation, the greater the insult, the more effective the attack may be. The
giving of really serious offence is neither incidental nor accidental. The
communication is designed and intended to cause the greatest possible offence
to its target no matter whether that target is a person, a group, a government or
an opposition, or a particular political policy or proposal and those who

114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Ibid 126-30.
[2004] HCA 25; (2004) 220 CLR 1 (‘Coleman’).
Ibid 54 [105] (McHugh J).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid 78 [197] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
Ibid 91 [239] (Kirby J).
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propound it.121

Offence, insult, ridicule and humiliation are inevitable incidents of
discussion about government and political matters in Australia’s
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible
government. Section 17(1)’s purpose in making unlawful of such conduct
fails this step of the modified Lange test. We will, however, analyse the
third step of the modified Lange test.
C Is s 17(1) reasonably appropriate and adapted to its purpose?
As the majority noted in McCloy, to meet the third step in the modified
Lange test the law must be ‘proportionate’ to its purpose.122 This means
that the law must be suitable, necessary and adequate in its balance.123
1 Suitability
All that is required is that there be a rational connection between the
means used in s 17(1) and its purpose. 124 This requirement is met:
prohibiting offence, insult, ridicule and humiliation has at the very least a
minimal rational connection to the purpose of prohibiting discrimination.
2 Necessity
This step requires that there is no obvious and compelling alternative and
reasonably practicable means of achieving the same purpose that has a
less restrictive effect on the freedom.125

121
122

123
124
125

Monis [2013] HCA 4; (2013) 249 CLR 92, 136-7 [85]-[86] (Hayne J).
McCloy [2015] HCA 34 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (citations
omitted).
Ibid.
Ibid [80] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (citations omitted).
Ibid [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (citations omitted).
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Here, we submit that, in assessing the necessity requirement, it is a
mistake to focus on alternative drafting of the provision in question, or on
one alternative law. Instead, when assessing a law of s 17(1)’s nature it is
necessary to look at the following:
1.

Whether one or more laws serve the purpose that s 17(1) serves in a
way

less

intrusive

to

the

implied

freedom

of

political

communication; and
2.

Whether one or more alternative measures (not necessarily laws)
serve the purpose that s 17(1) serves.

Hence, in the case of s 17(1), it is relevant to look at:
1.

Existing criminal laws;

2.

Existing anti-discrimination laws; and

3.

Measures that may be undertaken in civil society.

(a) Existing criminal laws
There are already criminal laws that serve the purpose of protecting
people from harassment and abuse. These are laws of equal application,
that is, they apply to all in Tasmania and are not limited to those who
have a listed attribute.
A common complaint is that minorities are subjected to bigoted abuse as
they walk down the street or otherwise go about their business. However,
s 12 of the Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) already prohibits the use of
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threating, abusive or insulting words calculated to cause a breach of the
peace or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned.126
Another common complaint is harassment of minorities in local
neighbourhoods, where neighbours repeatedly abuse minorities at or near
their home. This is in turn causes the victim to feel intimidated or
otherwise fear for their safety. In such instances, s 192 of the Criminal
Code 1924 (Tas) prohibits stalking, which can readily be applied in these
kinds of situations.
(b) Existing anti-discrimination laws
Another common complaint is discrimination or harassment occurs in
environments such as in the workplace, in places of education, or when
trying to obtain accommodation or goods or services. However, present
laws already cover such instances, not least including a suite of
Commonwealth anti-discrimination laws.127
(c) Measures that can be undertaken in civil society
In No Offence Intended, we noted that just because a government does
nothing does not mean nothing is done.128 Civil society itself provides
measures to combat racism. According to Martin Krygier, civil society is:
… comprised of multitudes of independent actors, going about their individual
or freely chosen cooperative affairs, able to choose to associate and participate
(or not) in an independent public realm, with an economy of disbursed actors

126
127

128

Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) s 12.
See, for example, Act ss 14, 15. As far as Commonwealth legislation is
concerned, see RDA ss 11, 12, 13, 15; Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
ss 35, 37, 39; Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) pt II div 3.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 204.
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and markets, undergirded by a socially embedded legal order, which grants and
enforces legal rights.129

As regards offensive speech, non-state actors may challenge that speech
by their own speech. Further, they may organise by free assembly to
magnify their voice and to speak out on behalf of those who cannot speak
for themselves. That is, in a common law system such as Australia’s,
those exercising their common law freedoms of speech and association
counter others exercising their common law freedom of speech to make
offensive remarks.130
People who are harassed may also pursue more direct, cheaper and faster
private solutions. For example, online debates, such as those on news or
opinion websites, often become heated. If bigoted slurs are used, then the
best response (apart from a sharp response by the person slurred) is to
report the slur to the website’s moderators. However, if there is sustained
online harassment, then there is recourse to the law against stalking,
which covers a wide range of conduct, including online conduct.131
(d) Enforcement of existing laws
It could be argued that present laws are not enforced often enough, and s
17(1) must supplement them. However, if these laws are not adequately
enforced then the appropriate response is to ensure the authorities
responsible for the enforcing the law do their job. Here, individuals can
work with representative organisations to monitor enforcement and
encourage authorities to actually enforce the law. Justifying new laws by
129

130

131

Martin Krygier, ‘Virtuous Circles: Antipodean Reflections on Power,
Institutions, and Civil Society’ (1997) 11(1) East European Politics and
Societies 36, 75.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 154.
Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 192.
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reference to the failure to enforce existing laws is an entirely circular
argument. Further, if existing laws aren’t actually being enforced, this in
itself gives rise to rule of law implications beyond the scope of this
particular article.
Ultimately, there are existing laws (either alone or combined with
measures in civil society) that already adequately achieve 17(1)’s
purpose.
3 Adequacy in its balance
This criterion requires a value judgment, consistently with the limits of
the judicial function, describing the balance between the importance of
the purpose served by the restrictive measure and the extent of the
restriction it imposes on the freedom.132 It should be noted here that the
implied freedom of political communication is a strong freedom. 133 We
will turn to assessing the nature and extent of the burden. After this, we
will turn to the purpose s 17(1) serves, which will include an assessing
the nature and extent of the harm s 17(1) addresses.
(a) The nature of the burden
As demonstrated above, the burden that s 17(1) imposes on the implied
freedom of political communication is direct, heavy, and sweeping.
Section 17(1) affects a wide range of discussion relevant to government
and political matters in Australia. It creates uncertainty about how it may
be applied, leading to the chilling of debate where debate must occur.
Unlike the law of defamation, s 17(1) restricts the discussion of groups
132

133

McCloy [2015] HCA 34 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (citations
omitted).
See Monis [2013] HCA 4; (2013) 249 CLR 92, 141 [103]-[104] (Hayne J). See
also Coleman [2004] HCA 25; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 49-50 [91] (McHugh J), 77
[195] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
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rather than particular individuals. This means its potential chilling effect
is far greater than that of defamation law. Section 17(1) also restricts
discussion of ideas relevant to government and political matters. It
purports to limit the freedom of expression of all Tasmanians who, as
Australians and part of a sovereign people, must be able to discuss
government and political matters fully, frankly and robustly. For the
reasons given below, s 55 does not adequately alleviate s 17(1)’s burden
and, indeed, creates burdens of its own.
(b) The purpose that s 17(1) serves
Section 17(1)’s purpose of prohibiting discrimination is laudable. It is
clear that s 17(1) was enacted to prevent certain harms. In No Offence
Intended, we made a number of points concerning ‘hate speech’ laws, and
the harms that they address, which we will summarise (and where
needed, add to or refine) here:
First, the onus is on those justifying s 17(1) to demonstrate that the harm
caused is to such an extent that it justifies restricting the freedom of
expression of every Tasmanian, even given the alternatives available. As
noted above, freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom, and one
with constitutional significance. Freedom of expression must never be
infringed lightly, and evidence for its restriction must be clear, if not
overwhelming.134
Second, a justification for broadly drafted and applied laws is that
minorities covered by such laws are protected from the harm that offence,
insult, humiliation or ridicule may cause. However, offence, insult,
ridicule and even humiliation are necessary incidents of a democracy
134

Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 130.
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such as Australia’s, where views sharply differ, feelings run high, and
robust debate must occur.135
Third, there have been a number of important reports concerning racism
in Australia. These include the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths
in Custody in 1991; 136 the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission’s

National

Inquiry

into

Racist

Violence

in

1991

(‘Inquiry’);137 and the Australian Law Reform Commission’s (‘ALRC’s)
report, Multiculturalism and the Law.138 However, none of these reports
recommended that speech that offended, insulted, ridiculed or even
humiliated be made unlawful.139 Indeed, the Inquiry noted:
The threshold for prohibited conduct needs to be higher than expressions of
mere ill will to prevent the situation in New Zealand, where legislation
produced a host of trivial complaints. The Inquiry is of the opinion that the term
“incitement to racial hostility” conveys the level and degree of conduct with
which the legislation would be concerned.140

Fourth, authors who have written on the harmful effects of racism do not
argue for laws as extensive as s 17(1). For example, Richard Delgado
proposed a cause of action where the plaintiff would need to prove that:
Language was addressed to him or her by the defendant that was intended to
demean through reference to race; that the plaintiff understood as intended to

135
136

137

138

139

140

See ibid 101-2.
Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody,
National Report (1991).
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, National Enquiry into
Racist Violence (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991).
Australian Law Reform Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law, Report No
57 (1992).
For the full discussion see Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto
Zimmermann, No Offence Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016)
96-9.
Inquiry 300.
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demean through reference to race; and that a reasonable person would recognise
as a racial insult.141

Note here the requirement for intent, something that s 17(1) lacks. Mari
Matsuda’s proposed law would have the following elements:
1.

The message is of racial superiority;

2.

The message is directed against a historically oppressed group;
and

3.

The message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.142

The measures in s 17(1) are far wider than what Matsuda proposes. In her
work, Matsuda provided a moving account of the effects of racism. 143
However, her research is not without its faults. Warren Sandmann noted
the following with respect to Matsuda’s work:

141

142

143

Richard Delgado, ‘Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name Calling’ in Mari J Matsuda, Charles R Lawrence III,
Richard Delgado and Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw (eds), Words That Wound:
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech and the First Amendment (Westview
Press, 1993) 109.
Mari Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 2320, 2357. See also Mari Matsuda
‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story’ in Mari J
Matsuda, Charles R Lawrence III, Richard Delgado and Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw (eds), Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech
and the First Amendment (Westview Press, 1993) 36.
Mari Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 2320, 2337-8: ‘As much as one may try
to resist a piece of hate propaganda, the effect on one’s self-esteem and sense of
personal security is devastating. To be hated, despised, and alone is the ultimate
fear of all human beings. However irrational racist speech may be, it hits right at
the emotional place where we feel the most pain. The aloneness comes not only
from the hate message itself, but also from the government response of
tolerance’. See also Mari Matsuda ‘Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim’s Story’ in Mari J Matsuda, Charles R Lawrence III,
Richard Delgado and Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw (eds), Words That Wound:
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech and the First Amendment (Westview
Press, 1993) 25.
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Matsuda utilizes personal experience, narratives and oral histories as evidence
to support a claim. While Matsuda also uses more traditional evidential sources
(government reports and statistical findings), the heart of her argument – that
hate speech causes real harm to individuals – is bolstered mainly by anecdotal
evidence and behavioristic studies showing a relationship between hate speech
and psychological and physiological harm. While there is no question that some
targets of hate-speech suffer from these symptoms, nor that this suffering is
great, there is a question concerning the strength of the relationship between the
speech and the harm. … [Matsuda] offers little evidence that even the majority
of recipients will respond to hate speech in the same way.144

Sandmann further noted:
[M]ore importantly than the lack of evidence to support her claim is her
dependence on the notion of a virtual cause-effect relationship between word
and deed. … Contemporary theorists have strongly questioned the possibility of
showing a direct link between word and response. To propose a restriction on
certain forms of speech that have been shown only anecdotally and questionably
to ‘cause’ harm is, at best, an overreach on Matsuda’s part.145

We will return to Sandmann’s criticisms shortly, as they are relevant to
the next point.
Fifth, and lastly, the Australian Human Rights Commission has noted that
there has been very little qualitative research on the lived experience of
racism in Australia.146 That said, Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara
have attempted to address this in their recent work concerning hate
speech, its harms, and the need for broadly-drafted legislation to combat
144

145

146

Warren Sandmann, ‘Three Ifs and a Maybe: Mari Matsuda’s Approach to
Restricting Hate Speech Laws’ (1994) 45 (3-4) Communication Studies 241,
250 (citations omitted).
Ibid (citations omitted). See 249-254 for Sandmann’s other criticisms of
Matsuda’ approach.
Australian Human Rights Commission, Freedom from Discrimination: Report
on the 40th Anniversary of the Racial Discrimination Act (Australian Human
Rights Commission, 2015) 6 [2.1] (‘40th Anniversary Report’).
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it.147 In particular, they aim to provide empirical evidence of the harms of
hate speech. 148 However, and with the greatest of respect, Gelber and
McNamara’s analysis is unsatisfactory. Space precludes us from a
detailed critique. However, we make the following points.
First, Gelber and McNamara interviewed 101 people across various
racial, ethnic and religious groups concerning their experience of racism
in Australia. 149 While the sample size is statistically significant, it is
nevertheless relatively small, and thus prone to a substantial margin of
error when extrapolated to Australia’s population as a whole.150
Second, of the people interviewed, 32 were community spokespeople and
69 were ordinary community members. 151 A better sample would be
randomly selected. This is because the 32 community spokespeople may
skew the results. In fairness, community spokespeople may be more
aware of what is going on in their community. However, it cannot be

147

148

149

150

151

Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘Evidencing the harms of hate speech’
(2016) 22(3) Social Identities 324; Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara,
‘Anti-Vilification Laws and Public Racism in Australia: Mapping the Gaps
Between Harms Occasioned and the Remedies Provided’ (2016) 39(2) UNSW
Law Journal 488.
Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘Evidencing the harms of hate speech’
(2016) 22(3) Social Identities 324, 324; Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara,
‘Anti-Vilification Laws and Public Racism in Australia: Mapping the Gaps
Between Harms Occasioned and the Remedies Provided’ (2016) 39(2) UNSW
Law Journal 488, 488.
Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘Evidencing the harms of hate speech’
(2016) 22(3) Social Identities 324, 326.
There appear to be a number of sampling and non-sampling errors in Gelber and
McNamara’s work. For an overview of such errors see, for example, Australian
Bureau of Statistics, ‘Types of error’, Australian Bureau of Statistics (online)
<http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/a3121120.nsf/home/statistical+language++types+of+error>; Queensland Government Statistician’s Office, ‘Survey
methods’,
Queensland
Government
Statistician’s
Office
(online)
<http://www.qgso.qld.gov.au/about-statistics/survey-methods/>.
Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘Evidencing the harms of hate speech’
(2016) 22(3) Social Identities 324, 326.
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discounted that some may be motivated to describe an incident as racist
when in fact it is not.
Third, Gelber and McNamara identify the rationale for the groups
selected as follows:
We drew on the available evidence regarding racism in Australia to identify the
groups most likely to be subjected to racist hate speech. Relevant factors in
identifying the groups included the historical and enduring racism experienced
by Indigenous people, post 9/11 anxieties about terrorism, controversies over
asylum-seekers and visibility of recently arrived immigrant communities.
Interviews were conducted with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, Afghani,
Australian-born Arabic-speaking Muslim, Australian-born Arabic-speaking
Christian, Chinese, Indian, Jewish, Lebanese-born Christian, Lebanese-born
Muslim, Sudanese, Turkish Alevi, Turkish Muslim and Vietnamese people.152

Again, a better approach would have been to use a random cross-section
of various racial, ethnic and religious groups.153 The criteria that Gelber
and McNamara used would skew the results. This is because the group
selection appears, at least in part, to depend on whether or not there is a
controversy associated with group. Matters such as Aboriginal welfare,
terrorism and the level of refugee intake are matters that are, rightly, the
subject of vigorous political debate. However, this also increases the
likelihood of things being said about the racial, ethnic or religious group
involved that may be taken as unflattering. The method used to create the
sample risks portraying racism in Australia as a greater problem than it is.

152
153

Ibid 326-7.
The sample could have included (for example), immigrants from Great Britain,
Greece and Italy (in order to get a perspective of second and subsequent
generations of immigrants). The sample could also have included other
immigrant communities such as Kurds, Yazidis, Druze and Zoroastrians. These
communities tend not to have controversies associated with them in Australia.
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Fourth (and recalling Sandmann’s criticism of Matsuda), the evidence
that Gelber and McNamara collected is anecdotal. As we noted in No
Offence Intended, from a legal standpoint, such evidence may be
speculative, conclusory or hearsay.154 There also may be issues whether
the evidence is too vague, or makes sweeping generalisations.
Fifth, some of the evidence that Gelber and McNamara use to support
their claims about hate speech do not meet the definition of hate speech
that they provide. Gelber and McNamara use the following definition of
hate speech:
[W]e follow Parekh in emphasizing three defining characteristics. First, it is
‘directed against a specified or easily identifiable individual or… a group of
individuals based on an arbitrary and normatively irrelevant feature’. Secondly,
‘hate speech stigmatizes the target group by implicitly or explicitly ascribing to
it qualities widely regarding as highly undesirable’. Thirdly, ‘the target group is
viewed as an undesirable presence and a legitimate object of hostility’.155

However, while some statements they cite clearly meet the definition they
provided, they also cite the following statements as evidence of ‘hate
speech’:
‘I’ve been called names and like that when I was at school, those sorts of things’
When celebrating cultural and religious days and wearing national costumes,
some people ‘looked very strangely’ at community members, who said the
audience was ‘even using some bad and unnecessary words’

154

155

Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 85.
Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘Evidencing the harms of hate speech’
(2016) 22(3) Social Identities 324, 324 (citations omitted). The source that
Gelber and McNamara cite is Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Is there a case for banning hate
speech?’ in Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds), The content and context of
hate speech: Rethinking regulation and responses (Cambridge University Press,
2012) 40-1.
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Check out operators at the supermarket, ‘they will talk to the people and say,
“Good morning”, to the person in front of you or the three people in front of
you, and they come to you, and say nothing.’
A university newspaper contained a ‘star sign guide’ that included ‘this
interpretation that was derogatory of Aboriginal culture and dreaming’
‘It’s just a negative picture that you see in [the media] which actually portrays
just the bad things about India. It never portrays the good things’156

Readers will note that the statements are vague, and some are conclusory.
No specifics are given. There is simply no basis for concluding that the
conduct described in these statements meet Gelber and McNamara’s
definition of hate speech.
Especially concerning is the way that Gelber and McNamara treat
evidence of the media, of politicians and of children. As to the media,
they as cite examples of ‘hate speech’ the following:
‘Look, any time I pick up the paper and there’s a story in there about
Aboriginal people, it’s nearly always negative. That hasn’t changed and I don’t
know whether it will’
‘we’re portrayed right across the media as Aboriginal people in general being
destructive’
‘We feel very disappointed about the media’s interest in reporting the negative
side of China while there is so much… good news worth telling. There is a
strong hostility and prejudice towards China behind the media reporting.’
‘what danger is a mosque where people are going to go and pray in anyone’s
community? Would they object if there was a church?’

156

This is a selection of quotes from Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara,
‘Evidencing the harms of hate speech’ (2016) 22(3) Social Identities 324, 329,
331. We should note that we could have cited more instances of problematic
statements than those we have selected for this article.
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‘if an individual does something negative, that’s it, the whole community cops
it’157

Once again, these are vague and conclusory statements. The reader is left
guessing as to the evidence that forms the basis of these conclusions. As
to statements of politicians, the statements cited include:
‘Mr Howard stands there in parliament, “We don’t want those kinds of people”.
I have been in Australia 30 years by then’
‘So there always has to be the other and he has to be hated and he has be made
aware of, be careful, be alert. Back to the… time when John Howard said to be
careful, be alert and call up this number in case your neighbour is a Muslim’158

As to the first statement, it is vague. We guess that it is referring to Mr
Howard’s comments about the issue of asylum seekers gaining entry to
Australia by boat and, in particular, his comments about the events
regarding SIEV 4 (which later became known as the ‘children overboard
affair’). However, that’s the point: we are guessing. As to the second
comment, we are fairly certain (although, again, we are guessing) that
they refer to the Commonwealth government’s ‘be alert but not alarmed’
campaign in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, if
this is the case, the statement that Gelber and McNamara quote as
evidence of hate speech is simply wrong. The ‘be alert but not alarmed’
campaign was not encouraging the reporting of Muslims, but the
reporting of suspicious behaviour.159 These issues aside, immigration and
terrorism are clearly matters of public interest and debate, and are
157
158
159

This is a selection of quotes from ibid 331, 332.
This is a selection of quotes from ibid 331.
Clips from the ‘be alert but not alarmed’ campaign can be found on YouTube.
See, for example: CheesyTV, ‘Be alert, but not alarmed’ – Australian govt antiterrorism TV ad (2002), YouTube (online), 28 August 2013
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HWwJThlHqjs>; see also actualperson34,
Howard government anti-terrorism ad (2004), YouTube (online), 27 July 2014
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJDalHxp2i4>.
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contentious. Vigorous debate is to be expected. In any event, it is unlikely
that what Mr Howard actually said about these issues meet Gelber and
McNamara’s definition of ‘hate speech’.160
As to the statements of children, Gelber and McNamara cite the
following:
Australian Indigenous Footballer Adam Goodes was called an ‘ape’ by a 13
year old girl in the crowd
A teacher was giving a student a direction and the student replied ‘Go back
where you belong’
Interviewee’s child at school was told by another child ‘The fucking Indians,
you can go back to your country’
Interviewee attended school where other students believed the stereotype that
every woman in Afghanistan is uneducated and illiterate. When she told them
she had been in Australia for two years, they expressed surprise at her level of
education which they believed to have been achieved in only two years161

We’ll put aside other problems with the cited evidence and focus on this
one: in our view it is deeply problematic to cite evidence of what children
say. This is because children are, rightly, recognised in law as having
160

161

Mr Howard’s remarks concerning SIEV 4 were ‘I don’t want in Australia
people who would throw their own children into the sea. I don’t.’: samplenukes,
‘John Howard Children Overboard…remember this?’ YouTube (online), 23
November 2007 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3WJ10xGkas>. It was
later found that those aboard SIEV 4 did not throw children into the sea: see
Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, Parliament of
Australia, Report – Select Committee for an inquiry into a certain maritime
incident (2002) xxiii-iv, chs 3-6. However, despite being wrong factually, Mr
Howard’s comments were nevertheless made in the context of a public debate
about illegal immigration, and expressed an opinion, not about any particular
race, ethnicity or nationality, but about the type of person who should not be
admitted into Australia as an immigrant or as a refugee.
This is a selection of quotes from Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara,
‘Evidencing the harms of hate speech’ (2016) 22(3) Social Identities 324, 329,
330.
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diminished capacity. They are prone to say and do things that adults
would not. Further, it cannot safely be assumed that what children say
reflect what their parents have taught them or broader societal trends.
Finally, such evidence is of minimal value when justifying laws that
would restrict the freedom of every person in the relevant jurisdiction (be
it Tasmania, or Australia). As regards children specifically, the better
response is to educate them in the context of the particular environment in
which the offending remark was made. So, for example, if the offending
remark is made at school, then the school is best placed to handle it. This
alternative is faster and more productive than bringing the child before
the Tribunal.
Sixth, it is no answer to say that the quoted statements reflect the ‘lived
experience’ of those saying them and thus should be excused from
evidential standards that would otherwise apply. 162 ‘Lived experience’
does not render testimony immune from the infirmities that may attend
testimony from any person. It is a conceit – and a dangerous one at that –
to assume otherwise.
Seventh, some of the interviewees reported the effects of hate speech as
follows:
To me the saddest thing is [there] not a recognition of the special status of what
we add to this country. We don’t take away from; we add … but it’s always put
up there as a negative, that Aboriginals don’t add to the fabric of this country,
that we don’t – and … I think that it is painful … Yes, it does hurt and it strikes
at your very being.
When you see the infection of that kind of hate, that’s scary stuff.
162

See ibid 337; see also Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘Anti-Vilification
Laws and Public Racism in Australia: Mapping the Gaps Between Harms
Occasioned and the Remedies Provided’ (2016) 39(2) UNSW Law Journal 488,
489, 501, 507.
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We were worried about talking to girls, because it got to the stage where if you
were to approach a girl, she could turn around and say, ‘Lebanese, they are
trying to rape me, go away’… it created paranoia.
The media hate our community. They want South Sudanese to be frustrated and
feel as if they are not Australians.
If I’m in a busy train, I wouldn’t read my Arabic newpaper, so people would not
recognise me as a Middle Eastern.
The media … has reinforced a lot of stereotypes that we’re trying to break
down.163

Gelber and McNamara state that ‘The interviews powerfully document
the range of harms experienced in public expressions of racist hate
speech’.164 However, Gelber and McNamara are begging the question.165
That is, they assume these harms result from actions constituting hate
speech.166 However, they do not establish that these actions in fact meet
their own (or any other) definition of hate speech.
Further, recalling Sandmann’s criticism of Matsuda’s work, Gelber and
McNamara depend on a virtual cause-effect relationship between word
and deed. As to the quoted statements, Gelber and McNamara fail to

163

164
165
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This is a selection of quotes from Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara,
‘Evidencing the harms of hate speech’ (2016) 22(3) Social Identities 324, 333-5.
Ibid 336.
To avoid doubt, we use ‘beg the question’ in its traditional sense, that is, the
logical fallacy where one makes an argument using a premise that has not been
proved. We do not use it as it is now often used, as suggesting that a given
statement ‘raises a question’.
Gelber and McNamara distinguish between ‘constitutive harm’ and
‘consequential harm; ‘Constitutive harm’ is the harm caused in the saying of
hate speech; and ‘consequential’ harm caused in the saying of hate speech and
‘consequential harm’ is the harm resulting from hate speech; ibid 325. Gelber
and McNamara further distinguish between face-to-face hate speech and hate
speech that is genuinely circulated ‘such as by the media’; ibid 325-6.
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demonstrate the conduct resulted in the adverse effect.167 Once again, the
statements concerning the effect of the conduct (whatever that conduct is)
are vague, speculative and conclusory.
Finally, Gelber and McNamara take a broad view of harm. They use this
view to justify s 18C’s broad approach to hate speech. 168 However, a
broad approach to harm encounters problems with ‘concept creep’. What
do we mean by ‘concept creep’? Psychology Professor Nick Haslam has
noted that a number of psychological concepts have expanded
‘horizontally’ and ‘vertically’.169 ‘Horizontal’ expansion means a concept
expands to include qualitatively different phenomena.

170

‘Vertical’

expansion means a concept expands to include quantitatively different
phenomena, and usually less severe phenomena.171
For example, in psychology, a traditional view of an event causing
trauma would be one that would evoke ‘intense fear, terror and
helplessness’. 172 It would also be ‘outside the range of usual human
experience’ 173 and ‘would evoke significant symptoms of distress in
167

168

169

170
171
172

173

In fairness, there are certain statements in Gelber and McNamara’s work that do
meet their definition of hate speech and from which harm can be readily
inferred. However, and with respect, Gelber and McNamara should have only
cited such clear instances and not the more questionable instances.
Katherine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘Anti-Vilification Laws and Public
Racism in Australia: Mapping the Gaps Between Harms Occasioned and the
Remedies Provided’ (2016) 39(2) UNSW Law Journal 488, 506-7.
Nick Haslam, ‘Concept Creep: Psychology’s Expanding Concepts of Harm and
Pathology’ (20016) 27(1) Psychological Inquiry 1, 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 3rd revised ed, 1987) 250 cited in
Nick Haslam, ‘Concept Creep: Psychology’s Expanding Concepts of Harm and
Pathology’ (2016) 27(1) Psychological Inquiry 1, 6.
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 3rd ed, 1980) 238 cited in Nick
Haslam, ‘Concept Creep: Psychology’s Expanding Concepts of Harm and
Pathology’ (2016) 27(1) Psychological Inquiry 1, 6.
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almost everyone’.174 However, Haslam noted that the definition of trauma
had expanded ‘vertically downward’ so that now:
A traumatic event need not be a discrete event, need not involve serious threats
to life or limb, need not be outside normal experience, need not be likely to
create marked distress in almost everyone, and need not even produce marked
distress in the traumatized person, who must merely experience it as ‘harmful’.
Under this definition the concept of trauma is rendered much broader and more
subjective than it was even three decades ago.175

While noting that expanding certain psychological concepts had
beneficial effects,176 Haslam also noted:
[A]pplying concepts of abuse, bullying, and trauma to less severe and clearly
defined actions and events, and by increasingly including subjective elements
into them, concept creep may release a flood of unjustified accusations and
litigation, as well as excessive and disproportionate enforcement regimes.177

In liberal democracies, John Stuart Mill’s ‘harm principle’ 178 has long
been influential in determining when it is appropriate for a government to

174
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American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 3rd ed, 1987) 238 cited in Nick
Haslam, ‘Concept Creep: Psychology’s Expanding Concepts of Harm and
Pathology’ (2016) 27(1) Psychological Inquiry 1, 6.
Ibid 7.
Haslam noted benefits such as ‘sensitizing people to harm and suffering’: see
ibid 14.
Ibid. See also Jonathan Haidt and Nick Haslam, ‘Campuses are places for open
minds – not where debate is closed down’, The Guardian (online), 10 April
2016
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/
apr/10/students-censorship-safe-places-platforming-free-speech>;
Conor
Friedersdorf, ‘How Americans Became So Sensitive to Harm’, The Atlantic
(online), 19 April 2016 <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/
04/concept-creep/477939/>.
The harm principle is stated thus:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually and collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
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make laws. However, Mill formulated this principle when ‘harm’ did not
have the expanded meaning that some would give it today. A government
protecting against these expanded harms may undermine its liberal
democratic basis. For example, a government may purport to protect
people against expanded harms by prohibiting offensive speech.
However, doing so may well choke the freedom of expression necessary
for effective liberal democratic government.
Likewise, Commonwealth, State or Territory laws purporting to protect
against expanded harms may impede communications necessary to
Australia’s constitutionally-prescribed system of representative and
responsible government. Hence, when determining whether or not a law
impermissibly infringes the implied freedom of political communication
requires assessing the type of harm that the law addresses. Laws
prohibiting physical harm to people and property are more justifiable than
laws prohibiting acts that offend, insult, ridicule or humiliate.
Eighth, and to conclude on Gelber and McNamara, we are not saying that
racist incidents do not occur in Australia. Nor are we saying that people
subject to racism are not adversely affected. As we stated in No Offence
Intended, we believe that racism must be combatted.179 We also believe
that other forms of bigotry must be combatted. The issue is how best to
combat bigotry. Our point remains this: does the harm rise to the level
that it justifies restricting the freedom of expression of every Tasmanian,
even given the alternatives available? In our view, the evidence fails to
demonstrate this.

179

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Penguin Classics, first published 1859, 1985
ed) 68.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 13-4.
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Putting aside Gelber and McNamara’ work, we’ll be blunt about the
concept of ‘hate speech’ overall. ‘Hate speech’ is next to useless as an
analytic tool or as a descriptor. It is a vague, subjective, emotive term that
is frequently used as an ad hominem slur in order to stop or forestall an
argument. Laws, and courts interpreting the law, should avoid it.
However, and regrettably, some courts – perhaps most notably the
Canadian Supreme Court in Whatcott – have not. Whatcott’s
interpretation of hate speech, while admirably narrow, 180 is simply not
how the term ‘hate speech’ is used in public discourse.181 ‘Hate speech’
has become what George Orwell once said of ‘fascism’: a term that now

180

181

Whatcott [2013] SCC 11; [2013] 1 SCR 467, 497 [44] (Rothstein J). To be
clear, Whatcott’s definition of ‘hate speech’ include (what it describes as) the
‘hallmarks of hate’. In particular, certain groups are blamed for society’s
problems; that these groups conspire for global control; or plot to destroy
Western Civilization: ibid. ‘Hate speech’ also suggests certain groups engage in
unlawful activity, including conduct preying on children; or otherwise suggests
that certain groups are less than human: ibid 497-8 [45].
So for example, Jonathan Haidt and Nick Haslam recounted the following event
at Emory University in Atlanta:
Students woke up to find that someone had written, in chalk, the words
“Trump 2016” on various pavements and walls around campus. “I think it
was an act of violence,” said one student. “I legitimately feared for my
life,” said another; “I thought we were having a KKK rally on campus”.
Dozens of students met the university president that day to demand that he
take action to repudiate Trump and to find and punish the perpetrators.
Jonathan Haidt and Nick Haslam, ‘Campuses are places for open minds – not
where debate is closed down’, The Guardian (online), 10 April
2016<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/10/
students-censorship-safe-places-platforming-free-speech>. To avoid doubt,
student groups expressly stated that chalking “Trump 2016” amounted to hate
speech: see Susan Svrluga, ‘Someone wrote ‘Trump 2016’ on Emory’s campus
in chalk. Some students said they no longer feel safe’, The Washington Post
(online), 24 March 2016 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2016/03/24/someone-wrote-trump-2016-on-emorys-campus-in-chalksome-students-said-they-no-longer-feel-safe/>. With due respect to these
students, they appear unable or unwilling to grasp the nature of discourse in
democracies, or the fact that reasonable minds can differ over such issues as
illegal immigration. However, they appear altogether too willing to deploy a
term that will silence debate.
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has no meaning except for signifying ‘something not desirable’.182 We
fear that the Canadian Supreme Court in Whatcott, while meaning well,
has inadvertently lent its prestige to a deeply problematic and
increasingly pernicious term.
Issues concerning the term “hate speech” aside, we will return to our
analysis of the constitutional validity of s 17(1). Ultimately, for the
reasons noted above, that s 17(1) makes unlawful acts that offend, insult,
ridicule or humiliate appears greatly disproportionate to the purpose it
serves. Hence, these parts od s 17(1) impermissibly infringes the implied
freedom of political communication.183

182

George Orwell, ‘Politics and the English Language’, George Orwell (online)
<http://www.orwell.ru/library/
essays/politics/english/e_polit/>. Orwell noted elsewhere the uses of the word
‘fascist’:
It will be seen that, as used, the word ‘Fascism’ is almost entirely
meaningless. In conversation, of course, it is used even more wildly than
in print. I have heard it applied to farmers, shopkeepers, Social Credit,
corporal punishment, fox-hunting, bull-fighting, the 1922 Committee, the
1941 Committee, Kipling, Gandhi, Chiang Kai-Shek, homosexuality,
Priestley's broadcasts, Youth Hostels, astrology, women, dogs and I do
not know what else.

183

Orwell did, however, go on to note, that people did appear to attach an
emotional significance to it, saying ‘By “Fascism” they mean, roughly speaking,
something cruel, unscrupulous, arrogant, obscurantist, anti-liberal and antiworking-class.’ However, he then noted ‘almost any English person would
accept ‘bully’ as a synonym for ‘Fascist’. That is about as near to a definition as
this much-abused word has come.’: George Orwell, ‘What is Fascism’, George
Orwell
(online)
<http://www.orwell.ru/library/articles/As_I_Please/english/efasc>. As ‘fascist’
suggests that someone is a bully, ‘hate speech’ suggests speech that bullies
someone. However, also like ‘fascist’, ‘hate speech’ has become an emotive,
imprecise term deployed in a wide range of circumstances that is frequently
(ab)used as an ‘argument stopper’. Just as no decent person likes being called a
fascist, no decent person likes being called (in effect) a hater.
We should note, however, that s 17(1) also makes unlawful acts that intimidate
on specified grounds: Act s17(1). As noted above, because intimidation contains
an element of threat, making unlawful such acts does not impermissibly infringe
the implied freedom of political communication.
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SECTION 55

Section 55 provides:
The provisions of section 17(1) and section 19 do not apply if the person's
conduct is –
(a) a fair report of a public act; or
(b) a communication or dissemination of a matter that is subject to a
defence of absolute privilege in proceedings for defamation; or
(c) a public act done in good faith for –
(i) academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes; or
(ii) any purpose in the public interest.
Section 55 does not remedy those parts of s 17(1) that are constitutional
invalidity. Indeed, s 55 contains critical defects which, if anything,
compound their constitutional invalidity. Further, these defects raise
issues about the constitutional validity of s 55 itself. As presently drafted,
s 55 contains the following critical defects:
1.

Truth is not an exception to s 17(1).

2.

Fair comment is not an exception to s 17(1).

3.

It imposes a ‘good faith’ requirement on exceptions.

4.

It purports to extend a greater range of free speech protections to
certain vocations or ‘classes’.

We now turn to examining these issues.
1 Truth is not an exception
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This is a fundamental defect in s 55. Any law that directly affects
freedom of expression, over the range which s 17(1) covers, must have
truth as a defence. Truth (or facts, or correct information, or however one
conceptualises verity) is absolutely critical to the functioning of any
democracy, including Australia’s. The ALRC noted the following with
respect to the defence of truth in defamation that are also relevant to s
17(1).
The very fact of self government, of individual responsibility for community
affairs, imposes a greater need for freedom of speech. But there is no value in
falsehood; intelligent participation in civic affairs depends upon correct
information.184

Defamation law provides a defence of truth for good reason. A
defamatory statement against a person, no matter how demeaning or how
hurtful, cannot be remedied if it is true. The same principle should apply
to s 17(1). This is especially so given, as noted above, in Australia’s
political system, discussions about contentious issues involving groups
are common.
In Whatcott, the Canadian Supreme Court held that the absence of a
defence of truth was not fatal to s 14. The crux of Rothstein J’s reasoning
was as follows:
As Dickson C.J. stated in Keegstra, at p. 763, there is “very little chance that
statements intended to promote hatred against an identifiable group are true, or
that their vision of society will lead to a better world”. To the extent that
truthful statements are used in a manner or context that exposes a vulnerable
group to hatred, their use risks the same potential harmful effects on the
vulnerable groups that false statements can provoke. The vulnerable group is no

184

Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and
privacy, Report No 11 (1979) 19 [33].
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less worthy of protection because the publisher has succeeded in turning true
statements into a hateful message. In not providing for a defence of truth, the
legislature has said that even truthful statements may be expressed in language
or context that exposes a vulnerable group to hatred.185

However, with the greatest of respect to Rothstein J and the Canadian
Supreme Court, this reasoning contains grave errors. First, Rothstein J
applied Dickson CJ’s reasoning in Keegstra. However, Keegstra
concerned a law that did contain an element of intent to incite hatred.186 It
is one thing to use truth in a manner intended to incite hatred. It is quite
another for a tribunal or court to ‘deem’ a true statement as inciting
hatred despite the speaker’s intentions.
Second, Rothstein’s use of this phrase is concerning: ‘The vulnerable
group is no less worthy of protection because the publisher has succeeded
in turning true statements into a hateful message.’ The phrase ‘has
succeeded’ suggests that the speaker wanted to turn a true statement into
a hateful message. Again, this suggests an element of intent on the part of
the speaker. Once again, with respect to a law like s 14, a speaker may
not have intended a truthful statement to expose anyone to hate. Further,
it should not be assumed that, because a court has held that a true
statement was hateful, the speaker had a malevolent motive.
Third, the logic that Rothstein J employs is problematic. He endorses
Dickson CJ’s view in Keegstra that statements intending to incite hatred
have little chance of being true in the first place, or of leading to lead to a
185
186

Whatcott [2013] SCC 11; [2013] 1 SCR 467, 531 [141] (emphasis ours).
Section 319(2) of Canada’s Criminal Code (the provision under scrutiny in
Keegstra) provides that ‘Every one who, by communicating statements, other
than by private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against an identifiable
group is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary
conviction’ (emphasis ours).
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better world. Hence, there is little lost in deeming true statements as
hateful. However, when applied the operation of s 14, Rothstein J is in
effect saying with respect to truth: ‘When a court deems a statement to be
hateful, the statement is unlikely to be true even if the statement is true.’
In defamation, the defence of truth assists defendants where they did not
intend make a defamatory statement, but a court later holds that the
statement did in fact expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule
by ordinary, reasonable members of society.187 The law of defamation is
perhaps the closest analogue to hate speech laws. Once again, if a person
defamed must bear the hurt of a truthful statement, the same applies to a
group.188
2 Fair comment is not an exception
Compounding s 55 problems is the fact that fair comment is not an
exception. This is a defect that even s 18D of the RDA does not have.189
Fair comment is an important defence in defamation. ‘The right of fair
comment is one of the fundamental rights of free speech and writing … it
is of vital importance to the rule of law on which we depend for our
personal freedom’.190 The scope of what can be considered ‘fair’ is wide:
‘it can be “fair” however exaggerated or even prejudiced be the language
of the criticism’.191

187
188

189

190

191

Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 151 ER 340, 352.
For further exploration of defamation’s comparison with hate speech laws see
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 186-9.
And there are significant problems with s 18D as regards the implied freedom of
political communication. See ibid 159-73.
Lyon v Daily Telegraph [1943] 1 KB 746, 753 (Scott LJ) quoted in Patrick
Milmo and WVH Rogers (eds), Gatley on Libel and Slander (Sweet &
Maxwell, 9th ed, 1998) [12.1].
Ibid [12.22].
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We should note here that Lange examined how defences affect a law’s
burden on the implied freedom of political communication. In Lange, the
High Court held that the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) (‘the NSW
Defamation Act’) was consistent with the implied freedom of political
communication. It noted that the NSW Defamation Act had defences of
truth and fair comment in a matter of public interest, fair comment about
parliamentary and similar proceedings, and both common law and
statutory qualified privilege.192 The High Court noted, however:
Without the statutory defence of qualified privilege, it is clear enough that the
law of defamation, as it has traditionally been understood in New South Wales,
would impose an undue burden on the required freedom of communication
under the Constitution.193

The High Court further noted that, once the common law was developed
to incorporate ‘Lange qualified privilege’,194 the NSW Defamation Act
did not unduly burden the implied freedom of political communication.195
Section 17(1)’s scope is wider than defamation’s, protecting groups as
well as individuals. Unlike the NSW Defamation Act 196 examined in
Lange, it does not have truth or fair comment (or, we might add, common
law or statutory qualified privilege or Lange qualified privilege) as
exceptions. Given the High Court’s comments that the NSW Defamation
Act would have been constitutionally invalid were it not for the range of
defences available, there is some precedent for suggesting that s 17(1) is
constitutionally invalid.
192
193
194
195

196

Lange [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, 569.
Ibid.
Which is developed in ibid 571-4.
Ibid 575. The High Court went on to note that, even if Lange qualified privilege
did not apply, the operation of s 22 of the NSW Defamation Act would mean
that NSW’s defamation law was constitutional.
The NSW Defamation Act has now been repealed.
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3 The ‘good faith’ requirement
‘Good faith’ is a vague term. It is used in a number of statutory and
general law contexts, but has been considered in the context of antidiscrimination legislation. In Delaney v Liberal Party of Australia
(Tas), 197 the Tribunal appeared to endorse the view that good faith
‘implies the absence of spite, ill will or other improper motive’.198
However, apart from Delaney, senior appellate courts in other Australian
jurisdictions have considered what ‘good faith’ means in equivalent
legislation. In Bropho, the Full Court of the Federal Court considered
good faith in the context of s 18D of the RDA. 199 French J noted that a
good faith exercise of the exemptions provided in s 18D ‘will honestly
and conscientiously endeavour to have regard to and minimise the harm it
will, by definition, inflict.’200 In the same case, Lee J was prepared to go
further:
The words ‘in good faith’ as used in s 18D import a requirement that the person
doing the act exercise prudence, caution and diligence, which, in the context of
the Act would mean due care to avoid or minimize consequences identified by s
18C.201

In Catch the Fire Ministries Inc v Islamic Council of Victoria Inc,202 the
Victorian Court of Appeal took a different approach. In the context of
whether or not an exception applied under s 11 of the Victorian Act,
Nettle JA (with whom Neave JA agreed) held that good faith required no
197
198
199

200
201
202

[2008] TASADT 2 (‘Delaney’).
Ibid [22].
Subsequent mentions of s 18D of the RDA will be to just ‘section 18D’ or ‘s
18D’ as the case requires.
Bropho [2004] FCAFC 16; (2004) 135 FCR 105, 131-2 [95] (French J).
Ibid 143 [144] (Lee J).
Catch the Fire Ministries Inc v Islamic Council of Victoria Inc [2006] VSCA
284; (2006) 15 VR 207 (‘Catch the Fire’).
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more than ‘a “broad subjective assessment” of the defendant’s
intentions’. 203 Further, good faith would be established where the
defendant ‘engaged in the conduct with the subjectively honest belief that
it was necessary or desirable to achieve the genuine [purpose]’. 204 In
Sunol and Collier (No 2),205 Bathurst CJ of the New South Wales Court
of Appeal agreed with Nettle JA’s interpretation of good faith.206
Hence, a Tasmanian faces a dilemma if they want to speak about a
contentious matter involving a person or group that s 17(1) protects. If a
complaint went to the Tribunal, would it follow Delaney? Or would it
follow Bropho, which is a very persuasive authority from a senior
appellate court? Or would the Tribunal follow Catch the Fire, a very
persuasive authority from another appellate court? Presently, good faith
in Bropho requires considerably more of a respondent than the good faith
of Delaney or Catch the Fire. Specifically, ‘Bropho good faith’ requires a
harm minimisation approach, that is, the respondent must conscientiously
endeavour to minimise harm. By contrast, ‘Delaney good faith’ requires
only that the respondent not be motivated by ill will, spite or improper
motive; and ‘Catch the Fire good faith’ only that the respondent have the
subjective honest belief that their act is necessary or desirable to achieve
the excepted purpose. The split in senior appellate authorities over this
issue creates considerable uncertainty. What’s a Tasmanian to do?
Of course, the High Court would provide authoritative guidance on what
constitutes ‘good faith’ were this issue litigated before it with respect to s
55 or a similar provision. However, three points should be made here.
203
204

205
206

Ibid 240 [92] (Nettle JA), 262 [197] (Neave JA).
Ibid. The purpose Nettle JA was referring to was a religious purpose. It should
be noted that the exception under the Victorian Act s 11(1)(b)(i) applies to ‘any
genuine academic, artistic, religious or scientific purpose’.
Sunol v Collier (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 289 ALR 128 (‘Sunol’).
Ibid 137 [36]-[40] (Bathurst CJ).
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First, the High Court’s determination will only be binding with respect to
the provision before it. It will be highly persuasive with respect to similar
provisions. However, similar provisions may nevertheless have text,
origins, purpose, or structure relevantly different to the provision the
High Court interprets. Hence, the High Court’s interpretation of one
provision is not necessarily definitive for all similar provisions. Second,
and in any event, it is patently unreasonable to expect people to litigate
matters all the way to the High Court to get final determinations on such
issues.207 Third, given the different uses of good faith in legislation,208 it
should be for Parliament to decide what it means when it uses this term in
a particular provision. We will return to this last point when we consider
below the issue of courts ‘reading in’ terms to legislation.

4 Expanded free speech protections for certain ‘classes’
Section 55 presently provides exception to s 17(1) regarding public acts
done in good faith for ‘academic, artistic, scientific or research
purposes’.209 The problem here is that these exemptions tend to benefit
those routinely engaged in such work. Those not so engaged must rely on
more uncertain exemptions, such as whether their act is done for ‘any
purpose in the public interest’. 210 The effect of the law is that certain

207

208

209
210

Indeed, following Fuller (noted above), it is unreasonable to expect any people
to litigate at any level in order to determine the meaning of terms. Parliament
should provide such meaning when a law is enacted. This not only provides
certainty in the law, it also minimises the risk that a matter will be litigated
(thereby incurring costs in time and money to all concerned).
In Bropho, French J noted that the term ‘good faith’ is used in 154
Commonwealth statutes: Bropho [2004] FCAFC 16; (2004) 135 FCR 105, 129
[84] (French J).
Act s 55(c)(i).
Ibid s 55(c)(ii).
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vocations or ‘classes’ of people enjoy greater free speech protections than
those falling outside these classes.211
In No Offence Intended, we argued that the Commonwealth Constitution
implies an equality of communication about government or political
matters (which we refer to below as ‘the implied equality of political
communication’).212 What follows is a summary of this argument.
First, the implied equality of political communication means that
Australian electors are equal concerning (i) the range of issues they may
discuss concerning government and political matters, and (ii) the range of
language they may employ when discussing these issues.213
Second, the implied equality of political communication arises from the
same provisions in the Commonwealth Constitution giving rise to the
implied freedom of political communication.
211

212

213
214

214

These sections

Dan Meagher quotes Michael Chesterman in noting that the interpretation of the
term ‘reasonably’ in s 18D is concerned with incivility in style and content, and
not so much with racist content itself. This leads to ‘a two-tier approach:
chilling of blue-collar muck and preservation of upper-class mud’: Dan
Meagher, ‘So Far So Good?: A Critical Evaluation of Racial Vilification Laws
in Australia’ (2004) 32(2) Federal Law Review 225, 249 quoting Michael
Chesterman, Freedom of Speech in Australian Law: A Delicate Plant (Ashgate,
2000) 226. Meagher goes on to note ‘In other words, protection is accorded to
racist communications so long as it is made articulately, using scholarly
language or socially acceptable conventions’: see Dan Meagher, ‘So Far So
Good?: A Critical Evaluation of Racial Vilification Laws in Australia’ (2004)
32(2) Federal Law Review 225, 249.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 164-9.
Ibid 164.
Lange [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567. These sections are
Commonwealth Constitution ss 7, 24, 64 and 128. We also noted that ss 51 and
52 provide for the matters in respect to which the Commonwealth may legislate.
This necessarily implies that Australian electors must have an equal range of
issues and range of language to discuss these matters: see Joshua Forrester,
Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence Intended: Why 18C is
Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 164. We would add that the plenary powers
conferred by the various State and Territory constitutions on their respective
Parliaments means Australians may communicate about a very wide range of
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necessarily imply that, in addition to the freedom to communicate about
their representatives and about Commonwealth executive government,
Australian electors must have an equal range of political issues they can
discuss and an equal range of language to discuss these issues.
In addition, equality of opportunity to participate in the exercise of
political sovereignty is an aspect of the representative democracy
guaranteed by the Commonwealth Constitution.215 In McCloy, Gageler J
endorsed Harrison Moore’s observation that the ‘great underlying
principle’ of the Commonwealth Constitution was ‘that the rights of
individuals are sufficiently secured by ensuring, as far as possible, to each
a share, and an equal share, in political power’. 216 The equality of
opportunity to participate in the exercise of political sovereignty, plus
each person’s equal share in political power, further support the implied
equality of political communication.
Third, the implied equality of political communication extends beyond
Australian electors to others in the Australian community. This is because
political matters not only affect Australian electors but those members of
the Australian community who cannot vote, such as children, people
disqualified from voting, corporations, unions and other entities.217
Fourth, the implied equality of political communication does not include
equality in the means by which views may be communicated or the

215
216

217

issues. Indeed, Australians may speak about any matter with respect to which a
Parliament may legislate (which is, in effect, anything and everything).
McCloy [2015] HCA 34, [45] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (John
Murray, 1902) 329 cited in McCloy [2015] HCA 34, [110] (Gageler J). See also
McCloy [2015] HCA 34, [27] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ), [219]
(Nettle J), [318] (Gordon J).
Lange [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, 571. See also Unions NSW [2013]
HCA 58; (2013) 252 CLR 530, 551-2 [30] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel
and Bell JJ). See also 580-1 [145] (Keane J).
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capacity to express those views. The means by which Australian electors
may broadcast their views, and the capacity to express those views, may
differ greatly. However, whatever means adopted or capacity for
expression, from the editorial of a broadsheet newspaper to discussion at
the pub, the range of issues and range of language that may be employed
should be equal.218
Fifth, the implied equality of political communication is perhaps already
foreshadowed in ‘Lange qualified privilege’, 219 which applies to all
equally no matter whether they are a natural person or a major media
company. Further, the common law220 defences for defamation apply to
all equally,221 as do the statutory defences to defamation.222
Excepting members of Australian Parliaments, 223 there is no reason to
grant greater legal protection to members of certain classes when
discussing government or political matters affecting Australia.224 In such
matters, the perspectives of electricians, nurses or architects are as
valuable as those of artists, academics or scientists. Indeed, each person
will have their own perspective on government or political matters. Each
person should be equal regarding the range of issues they may discuss,
218

219
220
221

222

223

224

See Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 166.
Lange [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, 574.
Which, it should be recalled, informs the Commonwealth Constitution: ibid 564.
See, for example, Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers [1958] 1 WLR 743, 746
(Diplock J): ‘Who is entitled to comment? The answer to that is “everyone”. A
newspaper reporter or a newspaper editor has exactly the same rights, neither
more or less, than every other citizen’.
See, for example, Defamation Act 2005 (WA) pt 4 div 2. Australia now has
uniform defamation laws in its States and Territories.
Members of Australian Parliaments should, as law-makers and the people’s
representatives, be free to robustly discuss proposed laws. They should be
entitled to the highest possible free speech protections while doing so,
particularly when they are actually in the parliamentary chamber.
See Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 167-8.
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and the language they may use to discuss these issues.225 Put another way,
unless there is very good reason,226 either all Australians are bound by the
same restriction on freedom of expression, or none of them are.227

VI

THE PROPOSED REFORMS

The proposed reforms make s 55 worse. This is because:
1.

It adds ‘religious purposes’ to the vocations or ‘classes’ that enjoy a
greater range of free speech protections.228

2.

The proposed reforms to s 64 do not go far enough to protect people
in the complaints process.

We will examine these issues in turn. However, as noted above, we will
also

consider

issues

arising

from

inserting

a

‘reasonableness

requirement’.
A Adding ‘religious purposes’ as a protected ‘class’ to s 55
Adding an additional protected ‘class’ does not overcome the problems
noted above with respect to those classes that s 55 presently covers. If
anything, adding a class compounds the problems. In addition,
determining what constitutes a ‘religious belief’ 229 may create further
uncertainties about the scope of the law.

225
226
227

228
229

For further discussion see ibid 168-9.
Such the protection of secrets vital to national security.
We would note that if s 17(1)’s prohibition on intimidation is constitutionally
valid, then s 55 creates an absurd result. That is, certain classes of Australians
may be able to intimidate minorities whereas others would be prohibited. Such a
prohibition on intimidation should apply to all Australians equally.
Ibid.
See, for example, Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v
Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 124 (Latham CJ) (‘Jehova’s Witnesses
Case’; Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) (1983)
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Section 64

As noted above, the proposed reforms amend s 64 to require the
Commissioner to reject a complaint in certain circumstances.230 We have
two points here. First, the reform is a step in the right direction. The
Commissioner should not be able to ‘punt’ a doubtful case to the Tribunal
on basis that an applicant might be able to prove their case. The cost of
Tribunal proceedings in time, money and stress is considerable.
However, it is exactly for this reason that we make our second point.
There appear to be no consequences to the Commissioner for breaching
their obligations under s 64 as amended. This proposed amendment
therefore provides cold comfort to a respondent who has had to incur
costs in meeting a case that the Commissioner should have dismissed
earlier.
Hence, we suggest that, where the Tribunal finds under s 99 of the Act as
amended that the Commissioner ought to have dismissed a complaint,
then the Commissioner should be liable to pay the costs of all parties to
the complaint. This recommendation is similar to that proposed by Tony
Morris QC with respect to s 18C.231
C

Should a ‘reasonableness requirement’ be added to s 55?

Amending s 55 to include a ‘reasonableness requirement’ would create
further difficulties. As with ‘good faith’, senior appellate courts are split

230
231

154 CLR 120, 136 (Mason ACJ, Brennan J), 150-1 (Murphy J), 173-4 (Wilson
and Deane JJ).
Bill cl 5.
Tony Morris, ‘There will never be winners under s 18C as it stands’, The
Australian
(online),
24
August
2016
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/there-will-never-be-winners-undersection-18c-as-it-stands/newsstory/1bacb30956b99217e34116f222196ff2?login=1>.
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concerning what ‘reasonable’ means in similar legislation. In Bropho,
French J stated the term ‘reasonably’ means an objective assessment of
whether an act bears a ‘rational relationship’ to a protected activity and
whether the act is ‘not disproportionate’ to what is necessary to carry out
the activity.232 This assessment, however, allows for the possibility that
there was more than one way of doing things ‘reasonably’. 233 In Sunol, it
appears that Bathurst CJ (with whom Basten JA concurred) agreed with
French J’ approach.234Allsop P noted that ‘“reasonably and good faith are
sufficiently elastic to encompass “trenchant, robust, passionate,
indecorous even rancorous” communications’.235
In Catch the Fire, Nettle JA adopted a different approach. His Honour
held that determining what is reasonable ‘must be decided according to
whether it would be so regarded by reasonable persons in general judged
by the standards of an open and just multicultural society’. 236 Nettle JA
elaborated:
[O]ne is entitled to assume that a fair and just multicultural society is a
moderately intelligent society. Its members allow for the possibility that others
may be right. Equally, I think, one is entitled to assume that it is a tolerant
society. Its members acknowledge that what appears to some as ignorant,
misguided or bigoted may sometimes appear to others as inspired. Above all,
however, one is entitled to assume that it is a free society and so, therefore, one
which insists upon the right of each of its members to seek to persuade others to
his or her point of view, even if it is anathema to them. But of course there are
limits. Tolerance cuts both ways. Members of a tolerant society are as much
entitled to expect tolerance as they are bound to extend it to each other. And, in
232
233
234

235
236

Bropho [2004] FCAFC 16; (2004) 135 FCR 105, 128 [79] (French J).
Ibid.
Sunol [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 289 ALR 128, 138 [41] (Bathurst CJ), 145
[79] (Basten JA).
Ibid 143 [71] (Allsop P) (citation omitted).
Catch the Fire [2006] VSCA 284; (2006) 15 VR 207, 241 [94] (Nettle JA).
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the scheme of human affairs, tolerance can extend each way only so far. When
something goes beyond that boundary an open and just multicultural society
will perceive it to be intolerable despite its apparent purpose, and so judge it to
be unreasonable for the purpose for which it was said.237

In Nettle JA’s view:
It is only when what is said is so ill-informed or misconceived or ignorant and
so hurtful as to go beyond the bounds of what tolerance should accommodate
that it may be regarded as unreasonable.238

Once again, what’s a Tasmanian to do? Which approach is to be
followed? In any event, no matter which approach is followed, there is
additional uncertainty. As to ‘Bropho reasonableness’, there is
considerable uncertainty about what ‘reasonably’ means when applied to
various circumstances. One person’s idea of reasonableness may vary
substantially with another’s, even when a ‘reasonable person’ test is used.
In any event, the freedom of political communication extends to speech
that is done unreasonably and in bad faith. ‘Cheap shots’ and ‘hits below
the belt’ are common.239 As noted above, in political argument all logical
and rhetorical weapons are brought to bear on an opponent’s position. In
such arguments, a person may think they are simply presenting their side
of the argument. By contrast, their opponent may think that person is
being hyperbolic, disingenuous or tendentious, and hence advancing their
purpose in a ‘disproportionate’ way.240
‘Catch the Fire reasonableness’ creates its own uncertainties. Reasonable
minds may well differ about whether a particular statement is so ill237
238
239

240

Ibid 241 [96] (Nettle JA) (citation omitted).
Ibid 242 (Nettle JA) [98].
See Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 50.
Ibid 162.
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informed or misconceived or ignorant as to be regarded as unreasonable
in an open and just multicultural society. Further, this test encounters a
difficulty we noted in No Offence Intended. Specifically, multiculturalism
is a longstanding (and largely successful) policy of the Commonwealth
government. However, multiculturalism is, nevertheless, still a policy.241
The policy, and the laws and executive actions by which it is
implemented, is subject to debate – and to change – in Australia’s
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible
government.
Consequently, any reasonable person tests in legislation affecting the
implied freedom of political communication should account only for
those things presently ‘hard wired’ into the Commonwealth Constitution.
The reasonable person we proposed in No Offence Intended was as
follows:
[A] citizen of Australia who is aware that Australia has a constitutionally
prescribed system of representative and responsible government and the need to
communicate about matters related to politics and government fully, frankly and
robustly.242

The test we proposed reflects the High Court’s observation in Lange that
‘The Constitution, the federal, State and territorial laws, and the common
law in Australia together constitute the law of this country and form 'one
system of jurisprudence”’, 243 and that the Commonwealth Constitution
influences, and is influenced by, the common law.244 The Commonwealth
Constitution therefore influences the construal of statutes and common
law principles affecting the implied freedom of political communication.
241
242
243
244

Ibid 207.
Ibid 224.
Lange [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, 564 (citations omitted).
Ibid.
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Reasonable person tests affecting the implied freedom of political
communication – no matter whether in statute or common law – should
be modified so they, as far as possible, do not infringe upon the implied
freedom of political communication.
Of course, were the Commonwealth Constitution amended to (like
Canada’s Constitution) include multiculturalism, then it may influence
reasonable person tests in the manner Nettle JA described.
Ultimately, however, the proposed ‘reasonableness’ requirement creates
difficulties in a manner similar to the present ‘good faith’ requirement.
Parliament must provide more clarity concerning how the term
‘reasonably’ is to be interpreted. 245 Otherwise any such requirement
creates a real risk of chilling discussion and debate.

VII

SECTION 19

Section 19 of the Act is entitled ‘Inciting hatred’ and presently provides:
A person, by a public act, must not incite hatred towards, serious
contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or a group of persons on the
ground of –
(a) the race of the person or any member of the group; or
(b) any disability of the person or any member of the group; or
(c) the sexual orientation or lawful sexual activity of the person or
any member of the group; or

245

Bill cl 4.
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(d) the religious belief or affiliation or religious activity of the
person or any member of the group.246
Section 19 appears modelled closely on equivalent provisions of the
NSW Act and, in particular, ss 20C247 and 49ZT248 of the NSW Act.249 It
is also similar to ss 7(1) and 8(1) 250 of the Victorian Act. 251 It is also
worth noting that NSW’s racial vilification legislation served as the
model for s 18C.252 Hence, case law relevant to ss 20C, 49ZT, 8(1) and
18C will be referred to in this Part as well as case law concerning s 19.
As with s 17(1), we will apply the modified Lange test.
A The burden on the implied freedom of political communication
Like s 17(1), s 19 burdens the implied freedom of political
communication. Section 19 is more tightly drafted than s 17(1), being
confined to prohibiting ‘public acts’ 253 that incite ‘hatred’, ‘serious
contempt’, and ‘severe ridicule’. 254 However, even so drafted, s 19
burdens the implied freedom of political communication in a way that is
direct, heavy, and sweeping.

246
247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

Act s 19.
Subsequent mentions of s 20C of the NSW Act will be to just ‘section 20C’ or
‘s 20C’ as the case requires.
Subsequent mentions of s 49ZT of the NSW Act will be to just ‘section 49ZT’
or ‘s 49ZT’ as the case requires.
We should note, however, that unlike s 19, the NSW Act has no provisions for
vilification on the grounds of disability, or of religious belief, affiliation or
activity.
Subsequent mentions of s 8(1) of the Victorian Act will be to just ‘section 8(1)’
or ‘s 8(1)’ as the case requires.
See also Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 67A; Anti-Discrimination Act 1991
(Qld) s 124A.
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives,
15 November 1994, 3341 (Michael Lavarch).
Act s 3 (definition of public act’) provides that ‘public act’ includes – (a) any
form of communication to the public; or (b) any conduct observable by the
public; or (c) the distribution or dissemination of any matter to the public
Act s 19.
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1 A direct burden
Similarly, to s 17(1) as noted above, s 19 imposes a direct burden on the
implied freedom of political communication as regards race and
sexuality. In addition, s 19 imposes a direct burden as regards to religion
and disability.
As to religion, the Full Court of the Federal Court noted in Evans that
‘Religious beliefs and doctrines frequently attract public debate and
sometimes have political consequences reflected in government laws and
policies’. 255 The political character of religious belief has long been
recognised. In the Jehovah’s Witnesses Case Incorporated, 256 after
observing that early Christians, as well as Anabaptists and Jehovah’s
Witnesses, refused to participate in civil government, Latham CJ went on
to observe:
It cannot be said that beliefs upon such matters founded upon Biblical authority
(as understood by those who held them) are not religious in character. Such
beliefs are concerned with the relation between man and the God whom he
worships, although they are also concerned with the relation between man and
the civil government under which he lives. They are political in character, but
they are none the less religious on that account.257

Those whose political positions are informed by their religious views may
express those religious/political views and, in turn, have them subject to
criticism.

255

256
257

Evans [2008] FCAFC 130; (2008) 168 FCR 576, 578 [2] (French, Branson and
Stone JJ).
[1943] HCA 12; (1943) 67 CLR 116.
Ibid 125 (Latham CJ) (emphasis ours). It should be noted that, while he added
his own brief reasons, McTiernan J agreed with the Latham CJ’s reasons
overall: see ibid 156 (McTiernan J).
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As to disability, communications about government and political matters
may involve discussing the physical or mental capacity of persons
directly involved with government. Alternatively, such communications
may involve laws or policies affecting the mentally or physically
disabled. Of course, it cannot be overlooked that arguments about
government or political matters may involve epithets about mental
capacity being thrown about freely. For example, it may be said of an
advocate of a law, policy, position or idea that they are ‘crazy’, ‘insane’,
‘bonkers’ or ‘nuts’. While these descriptors have long been used, to some
they may be regarded as ableist slurs.258
2 A heavy burden
The issues we noted with respect to s 17(1) apply here.
(a) Popular sovereignty
Again, the Australian people as sovereign must be able to discuss any
matter that may be the subject of Commonwealth or State legislative or
executive action fully, frankly and robustly. This may include discussing
matters in a way that incites hate, serious contempt or severe ridicule
towards an idea, a position, or even a person or group of people. Such
discussion is an inevitable incident of Australia’s constitutionally
prescribed system of representative and responsible government. As
noted above, in this system ideas, positions, or particular persons or
groups of people are the subject of (at times) withering public scrutiny.
(b) The general nature of laws and discussions about them

258

For further discussion of about this particular issue see Eric Heinze, ‘Viewpoint
Absolutism and Hate Speech’ (2006) 69(4) Modern Law Review 543, 566-9.
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As with s 17(1), s 19 ultimately may involve discussing groups. This
entails the same kind of chilling effect as noted with s 17(1).
(c) The uncertainty of the terms used in s 19
The uncertainty of the terms used in s 19 raises serious concerns about its
constitutional validity. Presently, s 19 is interpreted as follows:
− It is not necessary to prove that there was an intention to ‘incite’ or
that people were actually incited to hatred, serious contempt or
severe ridicule. Rather the test is whether the public act was
capable of inciting others to feel hatred or serious contempt or
severe ridicule. Merely engaging in conduct that conveys hatred or
expresses serious contempt or severe ridicule is not unlawful.
− The words ‘hatred’, ‘contempt’ and ‘ridicule’ are to be given their
ordinary meaning noting that the latter two are qualified by the
adjectives ‘serious’ and ‘severe’ respectively. Thus the public act
must be capable of inciting intense dislike or hostility towards a
person or group of persons or grave scorn for a person or extreme
derision of a person or group of persons. The conduct must be
capable of arousing reactions at the extreme end of the scale.
− The aspect of the conduct complained of must be assessed within
the context of the entire statement or publication.
− It must be established that the offending public act must incite
hatred towards, serious contempt for or severe ridicule of a person
or a group of persons on the ground of one of the attributes listed in
sub-paragraphs (a) - (d) of s19 of the Act. The phrase ‘on the
ground of’ means a ‘significant factor’, ‘a substantially
contributing factor’ and ‘a casually operative effect’ or ‘an
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operative ground’. There must be a causal connection between the
attribute and the feelings of hatred, serious contempt or severe
ridicule that are incited by the public act.”259
We will focus on two particular problems with s 19:


Does s 19 apply to public acts that actually incite, or public acts that
could incite?



The meaning of ‘hate’, ‘serious contempt’ and ‘severe ridicule’

We will now examine each of these problems in turn.
(i) Does s 19 apply to acts that actually incite, or could incite?
The definition of incite is uncontroversial. The word ‘incite’, given its
ordinary and plain meaning, means ‘[T]o urge on; stimulate or prompt to
action.’260 Case law has employed a similar definition.261 However, when
used in the context of s 19 an ambiguity appears. Specifically, s 19
provides that ‘A person, by a public act, must not incite hatred towards,
serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or a group of
persons’. In this context, does ‘incite’ mean public acts that:


Actually incite hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule; or



Could incite hatred, serious contempt, or severe ridicule?

259
260

261

Wood v Gerke [2007] TASADT 3 [85] (‘Wood’) (emphasis in original).
Butler, Susan (ed), Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Macquarie Dictionary
Publishers, 6th ed, 2013) 750.
See, for example, Kazak v John Fairfax Publications Ltd [2000] NSWADT 77
[23] (‘Kazak’); Catch the Fire [2006] VSCA 284; (2006) 15 VR 207, 211 [13]
(Nettle JA); Sunol [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 289 ALR 128, 135 [26]-[27]
(Bathurst CJ).
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Case law suggests the latter interpretation. That is, ‘incite’ means public
acts that could incite hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule.
However, the cases that hold this appear to demonstrate a common – and
critical – error of law, specifically the failure to account for the principle
of legality.
The principle of legality is a principle of statutory interpretation. Under
this principle, there is a presumption that Parliament does not intend to
invade fundamental rights, freedoms and immunities.262 This presumption
‘can be displaced by clear and specific provision to the contrary’.263
Section 19 indeed invades a fundamental freedom: freedom of
expression. As noted above, it is a freedom of constitutional importance.
However, s 19’s use of ‘incite’ is neither clear nor specific. As shown
above, incite may be interpreted two ways.
Interpreting ‘incite’ to include public acts that could incite hatred, serious
contempt and severe ridicule is a far more sweeping intrusion into
freedom of expression than interpreting ‘incite’ to mean public acts that
actually do these things. Had Parliament wanted ‘incite’ to have this
wider operation, it could have easily included a phrase like ‘reasonably

262

263

Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24; (1990) 171 CLR 1, 17-8 (Mason
CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Coco v The Queen
[1994] HCA 15; (1994) 179 CLR 427, 436-7 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and
McHugh JJ); Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union
[2004] HCA 40; (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 [21] (Gleeson CJ); K-Generation
Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [2009] HCA 4; (2009) 237 CLR 501, 520 [47]
(French CJ); South Australia v Totani [2010] HCA 39 [31] (French CJ);
Harrison v Melham [2008] NSWCA 67 [7] (Spigelman J).
R v Secretary of State to the Home Department; Ex parte Pierson [1998] AC
539, 587 (Lord Steyn) (emphasis ours).
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likely to incite’.264 However, it did not. Hence, in the absence of such
words, the narrow interpretation of ‘incite’ should be preferred.
It is no answer to say (as certain cases have) that, in criminal law,
incitement includes acts that could incite criminal activity. In criminal
law, the basis for making incitement unlawful is to prevent others being
exhorted to undertake an unlawful activity. 265 Further, the person doing
the inciting would be aware that what was being incited was unlawful.266
However, hate, serious contempt and severe ridicule – even on the basis
of those attributes described in s 19 – are not themselves crimes or
otherwise unlawful. Rather, they are emotional states. Again, it must be
noted that freedom of expression – a freedom with constitutional
importance – is being infringed. It is one thing to limit a person’s freedom
to speak when that person would be aware they are encouraging criminal
activity (an assault, a theft, or the like). It is quite another to limit it on the
basis that the person may create emotional states that are not themselves
unlawful. Further, a person making the public act may not even be aware

264

265

266

A revised s 19 could read ‘A person must not engage in a public act reasonably
likely to incite hatred …’. The use of ‘reasonably likely’ is based on s 18C’s use
of this phrase to cover acts that could offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate: see
RDA s 18C(1)(a). Of course, the use of this phrase in 18C creates problems of
its own: see Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No
Offence Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 156-7, 191-2.
Hence, in R v Quail (1866) 176 ER 914, 915 there was incitement to rob; in R v
Krause (1902) 18 TLR 238, 247-8 there was incitement to murder; in R v
Assistant Recorder of Kingston-Upon-Hull; Ex parte Morgan [1969] 2 QB 58,
62 there was incitement to gross indecency with a child; in R v Dimozantos
(1991) 56 A Crim R 345, 349-50 there was incitement to murder; and in R v
Eade (2002) 131 A Crim R 390, 401-2 there was incitement to supply drugs. In
all cases what was being incited was a criminal offence.
This is an application of the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
The defendants in the cases cited in the previous footnote would have been
aware that the actions being incited were criminal offences.
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that their act could create such emotional states. 267 Finally, even if a
person was aware that their act may incite such emotional states, the
uncertainty concerning the relevant tests used to determine incitement
(examined further below) means that they could not confidently predict
whether or not their conduct would be held to be incitement.
However, narrowly interpreting ‘incite’ in s 19 creates problems of its
own regarding certainty. It will, of course, be necessary to prove that the
public act resulted in someone hating a person or group of people on the
ground of the protected attribute, or otherwise holding that person or
group of people in serious contempt or severe ridicule. However, the
legal liability of a speaker would then depend on the subjective reactions
of their audience. This means the operation of this law would be greatly
uncertain. People would have great difficulty predicting whether their
public act would inspire hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule in
certain members of their audience. Hence, the narrow interpretation of
‘incite’ is too vague. It would therefore impermissibly infringe the
implied freedom of political communication.
Before going further, we would note that the narrow interpretation of s 19
would be saved if s 19 had an intent requirement. Relevant case law has
(rightly) held that, as presently drafted, s 19 and similar provisions do not

267

As we noted in No Offence Intended, ‘[i]t It is one thing to attach legal liability
on a state of mind that the accused has consciously created, like knowledge or
volition. It is another to attach legal liability to an emotion: a state of mind
whose origins may not be conscious but visceral. Of course, individuals are
responsible for controlling their own emotions. Hence, a law could (but not
necessarily should) impose liability for expression manifesting an emotion.
However, it is legitimate to ask whether the law should impose liability on
expression that creates an emotional response in other people.’: See Joshua
Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence Intended:
Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 39 (citation omitted, emphasis in
original).

350

Forrester, An Opportunity Missed?

2016

require intent to incite. 268 However, were an intent requirement be
included in s 19, then it would sufficiently narrow its scope despite the
subjective response of the audience. That is, if someone intended to incite
hatred, severe contempt or severe ridicule, and the audience (whatever its
composition) was incited, then a breach could be determined. 269 That
said, even if s 19 did expressly include an intent requirement, other issues
remain concerning its constitutional validity, such as whether terms
‘hate’, ‘severe contempt’ and ‘severe ridicule’ are sufficiently certain (see
below).
This then leaves the alternative, wide interpretation of ‘incite’, meaning
public acts that could incite hate, serious contempt or severe ridicule.270
However, there are significant difficulties with this interpretation. The
first is that it, in effect, ‘reads words into’ s 19. As Lord Mersey observed
in Thompson v Goold & Co271 ‘It is a strong thing to read into an Act of
Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear
necessity it is a wrong thing to do.’272
The case law concerning s 19 and similarly worded provisions bear out
Lord Mersey’s observation. In these cases, ‘incite’ has been taken to
mean public acts that:

268

269

270

271
272

Wood [2007] TASADT 3 [85]; Sunol [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 289 ALR 128,
135-6 [30]-[31], 137 [41] (Bathurst CJ), 140 [55] (Allsop P), 145 [79] (Basten
JA); Jones v Trad [2013] NSWCA 389; (2013) NSWLR 241, 253 [49]-[52]
(Ward JA), 270-1 [155] (Emmett JA), 274 [175] (Gleeson JA).
This would, of course, require proof of intent (which may require employing a
test), and proof of incitement.
This interpretation would be open on the principle that a provision should be
interpreted so that it is not inconsistent with the Commonwealth Constitution:
see Monis [2013] HCA 4; (2013) 249 CLR 92, 208 [327] (Crennan, Kiefel and
Bell JJ) and the cases referred to in this paragraph.
[1910] AC 409.
Ibid 420 (Lord Mersey).

Vol 7

The Western Australian Jurist

351



Are capable of inciting.273



Could incite.274



Have a tendency to incite.275



Are likely to incite.276



Would incite.277



That the ordinary reasonable reader could understand that he/she is
being incited.278

These phrases give rise to markedly different ‘incitement thresholds’. For
example:


Would incite suggests that the public act be near certain to incite.



Likely to incite or tendency to incite suggests that the public act have
a greater than 50% possibility of inciting.



Could incite or capable of inciting suggests that the public act need
not have a greater than 50% probability of happening, but
nevertheless be a real possibility.



An ordinary reasonable reader could understand that they are being
incited suggests that all that is needed is that such a reader have an

273

274
275
276
277
278

Williams v ‘Threewisemonkeys’ and Durston [2015] TASADT 4 [32]. See also
Catch the Fire [2006] VSCA 284; (2006) 15 VR 207, 254 [154] (Neave JA).
Sunol [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 289 ALR 128, 135 [28] (Bathurst CJ).
Catch the Fire [2006] VSCA 284; (2006) 15 VR 207, 255 [160] (Neave JA).
Ibid 255 [161] (Neave JA).
Sunol [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 289 ALR 128, 136 [32] (Bathurst CJ).
Veloskey & Anor v Karagiannakis & Ors (EOD) [2002] NSWADTAP 18, [28]
(‘Veloskey’).
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understanding that they are being incited (despite the possibility that
they will be incited).
In Burns v Laws (No 2),279 the NSW Anti Discrimination Tribunal (‘NSW
Tribunal’) noted that the use of the terms ‘capacity’ and ‘capable’ ‘have
the potential to understate what must be proved’. 280 The NSW Tribunal
noted that
A test that required no more than proof that the relevant public act had the
potential or possible effect of urging an ordinary reasonable person to
experience one or more of the relevant reactions would in our view be unduly
broad.281

It stated an alternative test:
[W]ould the relevant ‘public act’ have had the ‘effect’ of inciting, in the sense of
urging or prompting, a hypothetical “ordinary reasonable person” to experience
one or more of the relevant reactions [hatred, serious contempt or severe
ridicule] on the [specified ground]?’282

Unfortunately, the NSW Tribunal’s views appear to have been largely
overlooked in favour of the ‘unduly broad approach’.
Ultimately, Parliament must determine the standard by which a law is
breached. This is especially important in laws that invade a
constitutionally important and fundamental freedom, and which may be
breached by the mere act of speaking in public. For all of s 18C’s many
faults, at least the Commonwealth Parliament gave the courts some level

279
280
281
282

[2007] NSWADT 47 (‘Laws’).
Ibid [110].
Ibid [112].
Ibid [111] (emphasis ours). The NSW Tribunal’s comments were in relation to s
49ZT, but is applicable to equivalent provisions. See also Brinkley v Davis Bros
Ltd [2008] TASADT 07 [210].
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of guidance by including in s 18C the phrase ‘reasonably likely’. 283
Stephen J in Marshall v Watson284 said:
[I]t is no power of the judicial function to fill gaps disclosed in legislation; as
Lord Simonds said in Magor and St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corporation
(1952) AC 189, at p 191, ‘If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending
Act’ and not in a ‘usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise
of interpretation’.285

However, the uncertainties do not stop at ‘reading in’ words to s 19 and
similar provisions regarding the ‘incitement threshold’. Courts have, in
turn, created tests based on these words. Hence, with regards to s 19, in
determining ‘whether the public act is capable of inciting others to feel
hatred’:286
The proper approach is to consider the impact upon an ordinary, reasonable
person. The range of people captured by this test includes people who are not
immune from susceptibility to incitement but excludes those who hold
prejudiced views or are malevolently inclined.287

However, and once again, views about this test differ at the senior
appellate level. In Catch the Fire, Nettle JA stated the test should not use
an ‘ordinary, reasonable reader’ test.288 Rather, the test should assess ‘the
effect of [the] conduct on a reasonable member of the class of persons to

283

284
285
286

287
288

Although, once again, there are significant problems with this phrase: Joshua
Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence Intended:
Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 156-7, 191-2.
[1972] HCA 27; (1972) 124 CLR 640 (‘Marshall’).
Ibid 649 (Stephen J).
Wood [2007] TASADT 3 [85] (emphasis ours). The point of our emphasis is to
make clear that the test is being built upon words being ‘read into’ s 19.
Ibid.
Catch the Fire [2006] VSCA 284; (2006) 15 VR 207, 212 [15] (Nettle JA).
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whom the conduct is directed’.289 That is, the particular audience is to be
taken into account.290
By contrast, in the same case, Neave JA (with whom Ashley JA agreed)
stated that the test should assess ‘the effect of the words or conduct on an
“ordinary” member of the class to which it is directed, taking into account
the circumstances in which the conduct occurs’. 291 Ultimately, the test
was ‘whether the natural or ordinary effect of the conduct is to incite
hatred or other relevant emotions [in an ordinary member of the class to
which the conduct is directed] in the circumstances of the case.’ 292 In
Sunol, Bathurst CJ (with whom Allsop P and Basten JA agreed) endorsed
the approach of Neave JA and Ashley JA in Catch the Fire.293
Hence, when assessing whether or not conduct (depending on the
authority applied) could/would/is likely to incite, or otherwise is capable
of/could be understood as inciting, the effect is judged by either:


The ordinary, reasonable person; or



A reasonable member of the class of persons to whom the conduct is
directed;294 or



An ordinary member of the class to which the conduct is directed.295

As regards all three approaches, the effect is also judged in the
circumstances of the case.296

289
290
291
292
293

294
295

Ibid 212 [18] (Nettle JA).
Ibid 212 [16]-[18] (Nettle JA).
Ibid 255 [158] (Neave JA), 249 [132] (Ashley JA).
Ibid.
Sunol [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 289 ALR 128, 136-7 [34] (Bathurst CJ), 140
[55] (Allsop P), 145 [79] (Basten JA).
Catch the Fire [2006] VSCA 284; (2006) 15 VR 207, 212 [18] (Nettle JA).
Ibid 249 [132] (Ashley JA), 255 [158] (Neave JA).
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We’ll no longer ask ‘What’s a Tasmanian to do?’ because, at this point,
they’ve probably concluded that it’s safer to just be quiet. But we’ll
plough on.
There is no certainty as to which approach the Tribunal would follow.
Would it follow previous Tribunal decisions, or one of the approaches of
senior appellate courts? As with ‘good faith’, with the ‘incitement
threshold’, and potentially with ‘reasonably’, there are a number of
approaches to the appropriate ‘hypothetical person’.
Again, Parliament must determine the ‘incitement threshold’ and the
appropriate ‘hypothetical person’. Lest it be thought that this is asking too
much of Parliament, recall that, for all its faults, at least s 17(1) provides
this:
A person must not engage in any conduct… in circumstances in which a
reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances, would have
anticipated that the other person would be offended, humiliated, intimidated,
insulted or ridiculed.297

That Parliament has not provided such guidance for s 19 gives especial
force to the remarks of Stephen J, noted above, regarding leaving to
courts to ‘fill the gaps’. This is because Parliament’s failure to provide an
‘incitement threshold’ has meant that the courts have ‘read in’ one.
Further, courts have then ‘read in’ a ‘hypothetical person’ test to
determine whether or not the ‘incitement threshold’ has been met. Again
recalling Stephen J’s remarks, it appears that gaps in the legislation have
resulted in courts (and tribunals) being engaged in (albeit unwittingly) the

296

297

Ibid; see also ibid 213 [19] (Nettle JA). This also appears to be the approach
when using the ordinary, reasonable person test: see Kazak [2000] NSWADT
77 [71], but see Veloskey [2002] NSWADTAP 18 [32]-[35].
Act 17(1) (emphasis ours).
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‘usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of
interpretation’. 298 Such usurpation, at the very least, is prone to cause
uncertainty concerning how the law may be applied in particular
circumstances.
However, State Parliaments ultimately having courts develop ‘incitement
thresholds’ and ‘hypothetical person’ tests may also create an issue under
Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution. 299 As noted above, in
Catch the Fire and Sunol, the Victorian and NSW Courts of Appeal
respectively ‘read in’ words and then based tests on these ‘read in’ words.
This could be taken as an exercise of legislative power that Chapter III
courts (as these Courts of Appeal no doubt are) should not be exercising.
As was noted in Western Australia v Commonwealth:300
Under the Constitution, the Parliament cannot delegate to the Courts the power
to make law involving, as that power does, a discretion or, at least, a choice as
to what that law should be.301

As also noted above, an ‘incitement threshold’ that must demonstrate a
member of the audience is being urged to experience hatred is far
different from one that need only demonstrate that a statement is capable
of inciting hatred. The latter threshold has a far more limiting effect on
freedom of expression than the former. Such determinations are better left
to Parliaments.
Overall, we express no firm conclusion on the ‘Chapter III issue’.
Ultimately, it is the uncertainties generated by Parliaments leaving to
courts the task of defining terms that is our principal concern.
298
299
300
301

Marshall [1972] HCA 27; (1972) 124 CLR 640, 649 (Stephen J).
The same issue arises for Territory Parliaments.
[1995] HCA 47; (1995) 183 CLR 373.
Ibid 486 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
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(ii) The meaning of ‘hatred’, ‘serious contempt’ and ‘severe ridicule’
In Wood, the Tribunal held that conduct said to incite hatred, serious
contempt and severe ridicule ‘must be capable of arousing reactions at the
extreme end of the scale’.302 This is an approach similar to that taken by
the Canadian Supreme Court in Whatcott to the terms ‘hatred’ and
‘contempt’:
[T]he legislative term “hatred” or “hatred or contempt” is to be interpreted as
being restricted to those extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the
words “detestation” and “vilification”. This filters out expression which, while
repugnant and offensive, does not incite the level of abhorrence,
delegitimization and rejection that risks causing discrimination or other harmful
effects.303

However, and once again, senior appellate authorities as well as the
practice of Anti-Discrimination Tribunals in other Australian jurisdictions
appear to adopt a less strict approach to what constitutes hatred, severe
contempt or severe ridicule. In any event, reasonable minds may differ
about what constitutes ‘mere’ dislike, contempt or ridicule on the one
hand, and hatred, severe contempt and severe ridicule on the other, even
when using a ‘reasonable person’ test or the like.304 Even if the test is
confined to the ‘extreme end of the scale’, reasonable minds may differ
about what is or is not ‘extreme’. Again, this creates an unacceptable
amount of uncertainty in the law. People do not know in advance where
the line is drawn so they can avoid crossing it. We will illustrate this last
point with two examples from case law.

302
303
304

Wood [2007] TASADT 3 [85].
Whatcott [2013] SCC 11; [2013] 1 SCR 467, 502 [57] (Rothstein J).
As we noted above, there are a number of ‘hypothetical person tests’ identified
in case law.
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In Burns v Dye, 305 a case concerning homosexual vilification under s
49ZT, the NSW Tribunal recounted an incident as follows:
Mr Dye, throughout the evening of September 1 1999, kicked Mr Burns’ front
door and in a loud voice repeatedly abused Mr Burns using offensive names
including ‘cocksucker’, ‘faggot cunt’ and other abusive names.306

The majority of the NSW Tribunal held that this incident did not
constitute incitement to hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule,
stating:
[W]e are not comfortably satisfied that this abuse would have incited [hatred,
serious contempt or severe ridicule] in third parties, including those not immune
from susceptibility to incitement or prejudice. In our view, an observably drunk
Mr Dye who, from the evidence available, from outward appearances would not
appear to enjoy any position of respect or influence, would be unlikely to
influence, urge on or prompt, any witness to this assault to feelings of ill will
towards Mr Burns. This is not to suggest that it is necessary to establish that the
vilifier commands a position of influence or power over the victim or his/her
audience (or potential audience) but rather that in certain situations this may be
a relevant consideration.307

The majority’s view was not shared by fellow NSW Tribunal member
Tony Silva, who reasoned:
I believe use of the words “cocksucker”, “faggot cunt”, “you're a fucking faggot
aren’t you”, “Faggot Burns come out and talk to me.” Etc, especially the first
two are of such extreme ridiculing nature that an ordinary reasonable person not
immune from susceptibility to incitement nor holding prejudicial view about
homosexuals would be incited to serious ridicule. I believe this incitement to
serious ridicule could take place independent of whatever unpleasant feeling or
even ridicule, they may have for Mr. Dye, the abuser. I believe people react to
305
306
307

[2002] NSWADT 32.
Ibid [54]. We note that this incident was one of a number covered in this case.
Ibid [65].
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what they see and hear, straightaway and though they may have second thoughts
about their feelings later. Being late evening/late night it adds to the incitement
to serious ridicule.

Our point is this: members of the NSW Tribunal came to different
conclusions about whether the use of vile epithets constituted incitement
to hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule.
In Burns v Corbett, 308 a local newspaper, the Hamilton Spectator,
published a story about Tess Corbett, who was standing as a candidate for
Bob Katter’s Australia Party. The story referred to a number of issues
about which Ms Corbett had commented, including ‘the Labor
Government’s controversial Anti-Discrimination Bill’.

309

The NSW

Tribunal then stated:
Immediately following a quoted statement by Ms Corbett that people ‘should be
able to discriminate’, the following passage then appeared in the article:“I don’t want gays, lesbians or paedophiles to be working in my kindergarten.
“If you don’t like it, go to another kindergarten.”
When asked if she considered homosexuals to be in the same category as
paedophiles, Ms Corbett replied “yes”.
“Paedophiles will be next in line to be recognised in the same way as gays and
lesbians and get rights,” she said.310

In holding that Ms Corbett’s comments constituted incitement to hatred,
serious contempt or severe ridicule in breach of s 49ZT, the NSW
Tribunal reasoned:

308
309
310

[2013] NSWADT 227.
Ibid [18].
Ibid [19].
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The main consideration underlying these conclusions is that, as Mr Burns
pointed out, Ms Corbett encouraged people to regard homosexuals as ‘in the
same category as’ paedophiles. For highly distressing reasons, the Australian
public at the present day is being made particularly aware of the serious and
long-lasting psychological damage suffered by victims of paedophilia. At any
time, and especially at this time, any pronouncement that ‘brackets’ (for want of
a better term) homosexual people with paedophiles is ‘capable of’, or has the
effect of, ‘urging or ‘spurring on an ‘ordinary member of the class to whom it is
directed’ to treat homosexuals as deserving to be hated or to be regarded with
‘serious contempt’. Ms Corbett's claims that these two groups are ‘in the same
category’ and that in due course the latter group will ‘be recognised in the same
way as’ the former group and will ‘get rights’ are pronouncements of this kind.
They do not merely offend or insult: they ‘incite’ these negative reactions.311

Before going further, we wish to make it absolutely clear that we each
personally strongly object to equating homosexuality with paedophilia.
However, with the greatest of respect to the NSW Tribunal, Ms Corbett’s
remarks consisted of:
1.

A brief statement about who she did not want working at a
kindergarten; and

2.

A one word reply to a question followed by a brief elaboration.

The ‘bracketing’ of homosexuals with paedophiles is hardly a new
phenomenon, and even today is not uncommon. To a not inconsiderable
number of people, homosexuality, paedophilia and bestiality are all
abnormal sexualities, and are grouped together as such. Further, Ms
Corbett’s remarks related to issues of public concern, specifically who
should teach children, and to whom rights should be extended. Given all
this, along with the brief nature of Ms Corbett’s comments, even an

311

Ibid [37].
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‘ordinary member of the audience’ would have difficulty being incited to
hatred, severe contempt or ridicule. This is so even if the ‘incitement
threshold’ is a public act ‘being capable of’ inciting (which is the
threshold the NSW Tribunal used in this case).
Overall, however, our point again is this: reasonable minds will differ
concerning whether Ms Corbett’s comments breached s 49ZT. This is an
unacceptable level of uncertainty. As the ALRC noted with respect to
defamation law, while the law ‘defies simplicity it nonetheless demands
it’.312 The same can be said for ‘hate speech’ laws.
3

A sweeping burden

Again, the issues we noted with respect to s 17(1) apply here. In addition
to race and sexuality involving ideas, religion itself concerns ideas
concerning spirituality.313 As to disability, mental infirmities often consist
of a conflict between a person’s perception of reality (that is, their idea
(or ideas) of reality) and actual reality.314
B

Is s 19’s purpose legitimate?

Applying the principles of statutory construction noted above, s 19’s
purpose appears to be to prohibit hatred on the grounds of race, disability,
sexual activity or religion, to reduce discrimination, or both. The issue is
whether these purposes are legitimate: that is, consistent with Australia’s

312

313

314

Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and
privacy, Report No 11 (1979) 28 [49].
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 135.
Mark Leary observed that ‘virtually every theory of mental health assumes that
having an accurate view of reality is a hallmark of psychological adjustment.’:
Mark R Leary, The curse of the self: Self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of
human life (Oxford University Press, 2004) 72.
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constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible
government.
We will assume for the purposes of this analysis that prohibiting hatred,
serious contempt and severe ridicule on the grounds of race, disability,
sexual activity or religion and reducing discrimination are legitimate
ends. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to fully explore the
issue.315

C

Is s 19 reasonably appropriate and adapted to its purpose?

1 Suitability
This requirement is met. As with s 17(1), there is at the very least a
minimal rational connection between making unlawful incitement to
hatred, serious contempt and severe ridicule and the purpose of
prohibiting discrimination.
2 Necessity
As with s 17(1), there are alternative measures in existing legislation and
in civil society that can address the problems that s 19 addresses.

315

We noted above that offence, insult, ridicule and humiliation are inevitable
incidents of Australia’s system of representative and responsible government. A
question arises as to whether hatred, serious contempt and severe ridicule are
also inevitable incidents. It is not uncommon in our political system for people
to hate or hold in serious contempt their political opponents, or to mock them
mercilessly. Further, the effect of Commonwealth Constitution s 116, which
provides for the free exercise of religion – including expressing beliefs about
practices that a religion may find abhorrent – may have an effect on the implied
freedom of political communication. Further, as we note below, discriminatory
laws may be enacted under the Commonwealth Constitution and the Australian
people must be free to discuss such laws. However, as we noted, a full
examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this article.
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3 Adequacy in its balance
Once again, s 19 purports to restrict the freedom of expression of every
person in Tasmania. It is legitimate to ask whether the harm of hate
speech justifies such a restriction. For the reasons we gave with respect to
s 17(1), the answer with respect to s 19 is no.
Section 19 has an admirable purpose: to prevent racial vilification and
reduce discrimination. However, as noted above, s 19’s burden on the
implied freedom of political communication is direct, heavy and
sweeping. There is considerable uncertainty regarding s 19’s operation.
Section 19 is too vague, and thus impermissibly infringes the implied
freedom of political communication.
There are a number of justifications for sections like s 19 that we should
address at this stage. First, it is argued that laws like s 19 can prevent
‘climates’ being created that make people feel unsafe. However, as we
noted in No Offence Intended:
[A]rguments justifying restrictions on freedom of expression on the basis that its
exercise creates a “climate” where people feel unsafe must be treated with
caution. Restricting freedom of expression requires a clear-eyed risk analysis of
the perceived threat. What is the source of the perceived threat? Is it a direct
threat against an identified person or group of people? Or (at the other end of
the spectrum) does the perceived threat stem from someone hearing comments
they simply don’t like? A person’s emotional reaction can be disproportionate to
the conduct about which they complain. Care must be taken to ensure that
claimed threats are not vague, speculative, exaggerated, or contrived.316

316

Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 85.
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Second, in Whatcott, Rothstein J noted that hate speech317 may reduce the
standing of groups in society:
Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing emotional distress to individual
group members. It can have a societal impact. If a group of people are
considered inferior, subhuman, or lawless, it is easier to justify denying the
group and its members equal rights or status. As observed by this Court… the
findings in Keegstra suggest “that hate speech always denies fundamental
rights”. As the majority becomes desensitized by the effects of hate speech, the
concern is that some members of society will demonstrate their rejection of the
vulnerable group through conduct. Hate speech lays the groundwork for later,
broad attacks on vulnerable groups. These attacks can range from
discrimination, to ostracism, segregation, deportation, violence and, in the most
extreme cases, to genocide….318

To Rothstein J, the effect of hate speech was relevant to the question of
whether a law restricting hate speech was proportional to its objective:
[T]he focus must be on the likely effect of the hate speech on how individuals
external to the group might reconsider the social standing of the group.
Ultimately, it is the need to protect the societal standing of vulnerable groups
that is the objective of legislation restricting hate speech.319

Rothstein J’s focus was on the effect of hate speech. That is, hate speech
may create a climate where discrimination could occur.
In No Offence Intended, we noted that Canada’s Constitution has
provisions concerning multiculturalism and equality.320 For example, s 27
317

318
319
320

Once again, it should be noted that Rothstein J uses “hate speech” in a narrowly
confined way: see Whatcott [2013] SCC 11; [2013] 1 SCR 467, 497-8 [44]-[46]
(Rothstein J). We reiterate the overall conceptual problems with “hate speech”
that we noted above.
Ibid 506-7 [74] (Rothstein J) (citations omitted).
Ibid 510 [82] (Rothstein J).
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 79.
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of Canada’s Charter of Rights of Freedoms (‘Charter’) provides that it
‘shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians’.321 Section 15(1)
of the Charter provides that:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.322

There are no provisions equivalent to these in Australia’s Constitution. In
No Offence Intended, we noted that:
Unlike Canada, there is no need to ‘read down’ freedom of expression in
Australia with reference to constitutionally-prescribed values. Indeed, if
anything, the implied freedom of political communication… appears directed to
ensuring the free and robust exchange of information concerning government
and political matters in order to effect Australia’s constitutionally-prescribed
system representative and responsible government.323

We will now expand on this statement. As we noted above, under the
Commonwealth Constitution, the Commonwealth Parliament has plenary
powers to legislate under its various heads of power. Provided a matter
falls under a head of power, the Commonwealth Parliament can pass laws
that discriminate on virtually any basis. Commonwealth laws presently
discriminate on bases such as age and mental capacity. 324 However, there

321

322

323

324

Charter s 27. Ibid s 25 also recognises rights and freedoms conferred on
aboriginal peoples provided by treaty or land claim agreement.
Ibid s 15(1). Ibid s 28 also guarantees rights and freedoms to males and females
equally.
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 79.
See, for example, the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 93(1)(a)
regarding the age qualification for voting; Criminal Code (Cth) div 7 regarding
legal capacity to commit a crime.
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is nothing stopping the Commonwealth Parliament passing laws that
discriminate on bases such as race,325 sex326 or sexuality.327 As also noted
above, State and Territory Parliaments also have the plenary powers to
make laws subject to the Commonwealth Constitution and manner and
form provisions. Unless so restrained, State and Territory Parliaments
may also pass laws that discriminate on bases such as age, mental
capacity, race, sex, sexuality and religion.
Given this, and given that the Australian people are sovereign, the
implied freedom of political communication extends to matters where
Australian Parliaments may pass discriminatory laws. That is, Australians
may discuss, and indeed may advocate, discriminatory views, policies
and laws. The fact that Australians can do this is relevant to whether s 19
(and similar hate speech laws) impermissibly infringe the implied
freedom of political communication.
It is no answer to say that treaties like the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘Convention’) prohibits Australia
from passing discriminatory laws. This is because, while Australia is a
signatory to these treaties, it remains a sovereign state in the international
system. Australia may therefore make laws that (say) breach the
Convention, but are nevertheless constitutionally valid and enforceable

325

326

327

Commonwealth Constitution s 51(xxvi), providing for special laws for people of
any race, makes this explicit. Historically, the laws and policies implementing
the White Australia Policy can be taken as an example of the Commonwealth
Parliament enacting (and the Commonwealth executive enforcing) racially
discriminatory laws.
For example, the historical restrictions on women serving in certain roles in the
military.
Ibid s 116 may prohibit laws being passed that discriminate on the basis of
religion.
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upon Australians.328 That Australia breaches the Convention by doing this
entails no consequence for it other than sanctions from other states in the
international system and from international bodies. In any event, even if
the Australian government complies with the Convention, the implied
freedom of political communication extends to the Australian people
advocating discriminatory views, policies and laws. By such advocacy,
and the democratic processes which the Commonwealth Constitution
provides, the Australian government may ‘change course’ on the
Convention and other treaties.
To be absolutely clear, we are not saying that Australians should advocate
discriminatory views, policies and laws. We are saying that, given the
lawmaking powers of Commonwealth, State and Territory Parliaments
and the principles of popular sovereignty, Australians can do this. No
doubt many will feel uncomfortable that the Commonwealth Constitution
and State and Territory constitutions allow this. The solution is to amend
these constitutions. Ultimately, however, the differences between the
Canadian and Australian Constitutions mean that this justification of hate
speech laws in Whatcott cannot be readily applied to Australia.
Third, in Whatcott, Rothstein J noted that hate speech 329 could silence
groups affected by it:
[H]ate propaganda opposes the targeted group’s ability to find self-fulfillment
by articulating their thoughts and ideas. It impacts on that group’s ability to
328

329

Whatever the effect of international law on the development of the common law
or on constitutional interpretation (and we venture no view here), the power to
make laws binding on Australians ultimately resides in the Commonwealth
Parliament under the Commonwealth Constitution. Hence, the Commonwealth
Parliament may, by express provision, override the common law and
inconsistent international law.
Once again, it should be noted that Rothstein J uses ‘hate speech’ in a narrowly
confined way: see Whatcott [2013] SCC 11; [2013] 1 SCR 467, 497-8 [44]-[46]
(Rothstein J).
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respond to the substantive ideas under debate, thereby placing a serious barrier
to their full participation in our democracy. Indeed, a particularly insidious
aspect of hate speech is that it acts to cut off any path of reply by the group
under attack. It does this not only by attempting to marginalize the group so
that their reply will be ignored: it also forces the group to argue for their basic
humanity or social standing, as a precondition to participating in the deliberative
aspects of our democracy.330

Rothstein J repeatedly refers to the silencing effect of hate speech. 331
However, while this effect is repeatedly asserted, it is not demonstrated:
Rothstein J does not offer any evidence supporting this claim. This is a
problem that has been repeated in Australia where, in Sunol, Basten J
asserted the following without providing evidence:
Conduct by which one faction monopolises a debate or, by rowdy behaviour,
prevents the other faction being heard, burdens political discourse as effectively
as a statutory prohibition on speaking. A law which prohibits such conduct may
constrain the behaviour of the first faction, but not effectively burden political
discourse; on the contrary, it may promote such discourse.332

330
331
332

Ibid 507 [75] (Rothstein J) (citation omitted).
Ibid; see also ibid 517 [104], 522 [117] (Rothstein J).
Sunol [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 289 ALR 128, 146-7 [86] (Basten JA)
(citation omitted). Arguments to the effect that ‘regulating’ freedom of
expression enhances public debate must be treated with extreme caution. While
superficially appealing, such arguments encounter the same difficulties with
uncertainty as arguments against ‘hate speech’. Once again, reasonable minds
may differ concerning whether a particular statement was a forthright opinion
on the one hand, or a coarse or unseemly statement that detracts from public
debate on the other. Forcing a speaker to state their position more politely may
in fact rob them of their freedom of expression. As Daniel Ward observed such
a position ‘ignores the extent to which one’s sentiments are inseparable from the
manner in which they are expressed ‘F**k war’ is simply not the same as
‘Down with war’’: Daniel Ward ‘Scepticism, human dignity and the freedom to
offend’ (2013) 29(3) Policy 15, 19 citing Cohen v California 403 US 15 (1971).
Cass Sunstein has spoken in favour of a regulated “marketplaces of ideas”: see
Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (Free Press, 1993)
18-9, 251-2. With respect, Sunstein’s arguments do not overcome the
difficulties we have noted concerning uncertainty. Indeed, his belief in the
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We grant that the silencing effect of hate speech is plausible, and that hate
speech no doubt has silenced individuals. However, the onus is on those
supporting the law that infringes the implied freedom of political
communication to establish that the infringement is permissible. Further,
with laws like s 19, they must establish that the infringement is
permissible even though the law restricts the freedom of expression of
everyone in the jurisdiction. Repeatedly asserting there is a silencing
effect does not overcome the apparent paucity of evidence that this effect
happens to a significant extent,333 let alone to the extent that it justifies
universally restricting freedom of expression of everyone in (in s 19’s
case) Tasmania.334
Finally, Canada and Australia are liberal democracies with common law
legal traditions. Each has well-developed civil societies. Each also have
numerous groups organised by such attributes as race, colour, ethnicity,
nationality, sex, sexuality, disability and religion whose purpose is to
defend their members’ interests and advocate on their behalf.335 The fact

333

334

335

capacity of government to effectively regulate freedom of expression
demonstrates a naivety only a technocrat could have.
This contrasts with the ‘chilling effect’ of defamation law, for which there is
evidence from media outlets: see Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair
Publication: Defamation and privacy, Report No 11 (1979) 22-3 [37].
Rothstein J did note that the Saskatchewan legislature was entitled to make the
law based on a ‘reasonable apprehension of societal harm as a result of hate
speech’: see Whatcott [2013] SCC 11; [2013] 1 SCR 467, 529 [135] (Rothstein
J); for Rothstein J’s discussion of reasonable apprehension of harm more
generally see ibid 526-9 [128]-[135] (Rothstein J). However, once again, the
Australian Constitution does not contain the prohibitions on discrimination that
are found in the Canadian Constitution. Further, as noted above, care must be
taken concerning what constitutes ‘hate speech’ and harm.
In No Offence Intended, we noted that a large number of groups participated in
AHRC hearings leading up to the publication of the 40th Anniversary Report:
see 40th Anniversary Report 55-8 cited in Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and
Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor
Court, 2016) 141 fn 522.
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that these organisations regularly and unflinchingly engage in public
debate counts against the suggestion that minorities are silenced.
Fourth, in Whatcott, Rothstein J noted the following:
The majority in Keegstra and Taylor reviewed evidence detailing the potential
risks of harm from the dissemination of messages of hate, including the 1966
Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, commonly
known as the Cohen Committee. The Cohen Committee wrote at a time when
the experiences of fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany were in
recent memory. Almost 50 years later, I cannot say that those examples have
proven to be isolated and unrepeated at our current point in history. One need
only look to the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Darfur, or Uganda to
see more recent examples of attempted cleansing or genocide on the basis of
religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation. In terms of the effects of disseminating
hateful messages, there is today the added impact of the Internet.336

In No Offence Intended, we noted the following about comparing Canada
to Nazi Germany:
We’ll be blunt: the remarks of the Cohen Committee and Dickson CJ [in
Keegstra] are astonishingly condescending to Canada’s citizenry. They engage
in speculation, ‘slippery slope’ reasoning and a reductio ad Hitlerum, all of
which are historically suspect when applied to Canada. In the lead-up to the
Second World War, with dire economic circumstances and fascism on the rise
in Europe and elsewhere, Canada did not go fascist. Indeed, Canada, along with
other nations with a common law legal tradition, fought to defeat fascism. In
addition, after the Second World War the horrific results of fascism were widely
known. With that experience, why was it a sound assumption that Canada (of all
places) may well go backwards?337

336
337

Whatcott [2013] SCC 11; [2013] 1 SCR 467, 505-6 [72] (Rothstein J).
Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 83-4 (emphasis in original).
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Our point is this: there were substantial social, cultural, political and
philosophical differences between Canada and Nazi Germany even in the
1930’s. 338 Such differences also exist between Canada and the former
Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Darfur, and Uganda. It should be noted
that Canada’s civil ‘hate speech’ law, s 13 of Canada’s Human Rights
Act, was repealed in November 2014. Since the repeal, Canada has not
become a racist hellhole, to the complete surprise of absolutely no one.
Canada and Australia are both liberal democracies with common law
legal traditions. As to Australia, it should be noted that, like Canada, it
has fought against totalitarian ideologies such as fascism and
communism. It should also be noted that, since Federation, Australia has
done the following:


Extended the franchise to women and Aboriginals;



Amended the Commonwealth Constitution so the Commonwealth
Parliament could legislate with respect to Aborigines;



Abolished the White Australia Policy;



Decriminalised homosexuality in all States and Territories;

338

It appears that social, cultural, political and philosophical differences between
Canada and other members of the British Empire on the one hand, and Germany
on the other, had been emerging for some time. Mervyn Bendle gives a
fascinating account of the ideological dimension behind the First World War. In
short, during the 19th century an anti-liberal ‘Germanic ideology’ had emerged
in Germany. This ideology contained a narrative of Germanic supremacy and
grievance, and was fundamentally at odds with the British Empire’s
predominantly liberal philosophy. These differences came to a head in the lead
up to the First World War. After the First World War, this ‘Germanic ideology’
formed the basis of Nazi ideology. See Mervyn F Bendle, ‘Beyond Good and
Evil:
Germany,
1914’,
Quadrant
(online),
28
July
2014
<https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2014/07-08/beyond-good-evil-german-mind1914/>.
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Enacted a range of anti-discrimination legislation at the State and
Commonwealth level;



Pursued a largely successful policy of multicultural immigration.

Each of these successes were achieved without ‘hate speech’
legislation. 339 They speak to the strength of the arguments supporting
them. They also speak to the political and philosophical ability of the
Australian people to debate and enact them. Given this, the claim that
‘hate speech’ laws are necessary to prevent Australia from sliding into
fascism is suspect given the historical evidence. (It is also, well, offensive
to the Australian people.)

339

Indeed, it should be noted that Weimar Germany did have ‘hate speech’ laws
(specifically laws against ‘insulting religious communities’) and prosecuted
members of the Nazi Party (including Joseph Goebbels) under them. The Nazis
turned their prosecutions to their advantage, painting themselves as political
victims: see Brendan O’Neill, ‘How a Ban on Hate Speech Helped the Nazis’,
The Weekend Australian, 29 March 2014, 16 cited in Augusto Zimmermann and
Lorraine Finlay, ‘A Forgotten Freedom: Protecting Freedom of Speech in an
Age of Political Correctness’ (2014) 14 Macquarie Law Journal 185, 191. It
also cannot be discounted that passing laws forbidding insulting religious
communities encouraged intellectual laziness in Weimar Germany. That is,
citizens of Weimar Germany relied on the law to stop extremists like the Nazis,
instead of challenging them in debate. As we noted in No Offence Intended, one
of the advantages of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is the discipline of competition:
That is, the need to respond to criticism and/or other perspectives keeps ideas
alive and vital: see Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto
Zimmermann, No Offence Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016)
81. To give an example of an effective alternative approach, Great Britain’s
tradition of freedom of expression allowed Nazi ideas to be ridiculed: see Mark
Steyn, Lights Out: Islam, free speech and the twilight of the west (Stockade
Books, 2009) 196. As Steyn noted
[I]f Adolf Hitler were to return from wherever he is right now, what would he be most
steamed about? That in some countries there are laws banning Nazi symbols and making
Holocaust denial a crime? No, that wouldn’t bother him: that would testify to the force
and endurance of his ideas – that 60 years on they’re still so potent the state has to
suppress them. What would bug him most is that on Broadway and in the West End Mel
Brooks is peddling Nazi shtick in The Producers and audiences are howling with
laughter: ibid 195.
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As a final point, we are aware that in Catch the Fire and Sunol, the
Victorian and NSW Courts of Appeal respectively held that the relevant
vilification provisions did not impermissibly infringe the implied freedom
of political communication.

340

However, these Courts of Appeal

considered the issue prior to the development of the modified Lange test
in McCloy. Further, and with the greatest of respect to these Courts of
Appeal, they did not consider the following:
1.

The principle of legality when interpreting the relevant provision;

2.

Whether or not it was permissible for the relevant Tribunal, or Court
of Appeal, to ‘read in’ words to the relevant provision, and then base
tests on the words ‘read in’;

3.

The concepts of vagueness or overbreadth (or otherwise issues
concerning uncertainty) with respect to the following:

4.

a.

The ‘incitement threshold’ of the relevant provision;

b.

The ‘hypothetical person’ test used in the relevant provision;

c.

The terms ‘hatred’, ‘serious contempt’ or ‘severe ridicule’;

d.

What comprises ‘good faith’; and

e.

What comprises ‘reasonableness’.

The effect of the absence of defences such as truth and fair comment
on the constitutional validity of the relevant provision.

5.

With respect to the issues noted in points 1 to 4:

340

Catch the Fire [2006] VSCA 284; (2006) 15 VR 207; Sunol [2012] NSWCA
44; (2012) 289 ALR 128.
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The direct, heavy and sweeping burden placed on the implied
freedom of political communication;

b.

Whether alternative legislative and other mechanisms perform
the same role as the relevant provision but with less burden on
the implied freedom of political communication; and

c.

Whether the nature of the harm that the relevant provision
addresses rises to the level that it justifies restricting the
freedom of expression of every person in the relevant
jurisdiction.

VIII SECTION 20
According to section 20(1) ‘[a] person must not publish or display, or
cause or permit to be published or displayed, any sign, notice or
advertising matter that promotes, expresses or depicts discrimination or
prohibited conduct.’
Essentially, there are two aspects of s 20(1): the first is making unlawful
promoting discrimination, the second is making unlawful promoting
prohibited conduct. As to the second aspect, assuming that ‘prohibited
conduct’ includes that provided in ss 17(1) and 19, then s 20 encounters
the same constitutional difficulties as ss 17(1) and 19.
This leaves the first aspect. Running through the modified Lange test
briefly, making unlawful the promotion of discrimination burdens the
implied

freedom

of

communication.

The

end

of

prohibiting
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discrimination 341 is an end compatible with Australia’s system of
representative and responsible government.
However, the first aspect of s 20(1) fails the third step of the modified
Lange test. Making unlawful promoting, expressing or depicting
discrimination is a broad, and vague prohibition. What comprises
discrimination? If s 14 of the Act is taken as a guide, then discrimination
is treating someone less favourably on the ground of a particular attribute.
However, political discussion and debate often involve making
unfavourable comparisons on bases such as race, colour, ethnicity,
nationality, sexuality or religion. If s 15 of the Act is taken as a guide as
to what constitutes indirect discrimination, advocating particular policies
may have an indirectly discriminatory effect. For example, advocating
laws applying equally to all may be taken as ‘indirectly discriminatory’
because they affect unequally certain groups identifying by race, colour,
ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, gender, or religion.
In any event, and as noted above, Australia’s system of representative and
responsible government allows for the advocacy of discriminatory views,
policies and laws. To prohibit the expression or advocacy of such views,
without more, impermissibly infringes the implied freedom of political
communication.

IX

RECOMMENDED REFORMS

In light of our analysis, we recommend that ss 17(1), 19, 20, and 55 be
repealed. In place of these sections, there should be a criminal law
provision against the incitement to enmity. This provision has two
essential elements. First, that there be intent to incite enmity or violence.
341

As opposed to prohibiting the advocacy of discriminatory views, policies or
laws.
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Second, that enmity be defined as either hatred or contempt ‘creating an
imminent danger of violence’ against persons or property.

342

The

provision could be drafted with respect to not only race and ethnicity but
sexuality and other matters covered by s 17(1) and s 19.
The reform we suggest applies to a narrower range of language.
However, we suggest that this reform would survive constitutional
challenge. The proposed provision, combined with other legislative and
non-legislative measures already available in Tasmania, will provide
sufficient protection against conduct that should properly be the subject
of prohibition by law.

X

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, the proposed reforms to Tasmania’s ‘hate speech’ laws
appear to be a missed opportunity. They will not fix the vulnerabilities to
constitutional challenge presently found in s 17(1), 19, 20, and 55.
Further, the proposed reforms pose no real consequences for a
Commissioner who refers a complaint to the Tribunal when they should
not have. We hope that, if Tasmania does not reform its laws to remove
constitutionally invalid restrictions on freedom of expression, another
State or Territory will take the initiative.
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See Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence
Intended: Why 18C is Wrong (Connor Court, 2016) 214.

